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ABSTRACT 
 
Modern technology records unprecedented amounts of data about individuals, and 
developments in surveillance technologies have removed many practical limitations on 
government collection of this information. A Fourth Amendment test called the third 
party doctrine permits the U.S. government to collect vast amounts of this electronically-
stored data without any individualized suspicion. This thesis explores how the failure to 
create legal barriers preventing indiscriminate data collection chills citizens’ First 
Amendment rights. Courts, legal scholars and social scientists have documented how 
pervasive surveillance restricts free expression and even free thought. This thesis 
endorses a technology-centered approach to the Fourth Amendment, which asks whether 
government’s method of collection has the capacity to facilitate broad, indiscriminate 
surveillance. This approach better protects free expression and reasonable expectations of 
privacy by focusing directly on the fundamental challenge facing modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence: the current practical and constitutional feasibility of mass 
surveillance methods that chill First Amendment rights. 
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“When the framers wrote the Fourth Amendment about searches 
and seizures, they didn’t envision wire taps. Therefore, the first decision 
was, ‘Well, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply to this.’ But it became 
pretty clear pretty quickly that allowing people to intercept private 
conversations constituted the same sort of search and seizure of material 
that the framers want[ed] to protect. So you try to find, at least I do… 
what the fundamental principle underlying the constitutional protection is, 
and apply it to new issues and new technology. … I think that is going to 
be the real challenge for the next 50 years: How we do adapt old, 
established rules to new technology?”1 
 
In the 2012 speech quoted above, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts 
addressed the challenge at the core of modern Fourth Amendment
2
 law: how do 
protections designed for old technologies apply to the technologies that replace them? 
This challenge is particularly acute when protecting against electronic searches and 
seizures, because in recent years, technology has changed the basic nature of how people 
communicate and store their information. Because of these changes, laws regarding 
searches and seizures now play a central role in protecting citizens’ First Amendment 
rights. In creating Fourth Amendment law, courts must recognize this development and 
design standards which can adapt to new technologies while protecting First Amendment 
rights. 
The core of American laws regarding the government’s ability to search and seize 
is individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy. The Fourth Amendment restricts 
                                                 
1
 John Roberts, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court, Centennial Lecture Series at Rice University 
(Oct. 17, 2012), available at https://mediacore.rice.edu/media/centennial-lecture-series-a-conversation-
with-the-. 
2
 U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”). 
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government action that invades an individual’s expectation of privacy if that expectation 
is one society recognized as reasonable.
3
 This standard separates investigative methods 
considered a Fourth Amendment “search” from those that do not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections.
4
 If a method does not constitute a search, government agents 
can perform this action without justification. If a method does constitute a search, the 
government may perform the search only if it acquires a search warrant or can justify the 
action under an exception to the warrant requirement.
5
  The exclusionary rule means that 
if police invade a suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy without a warrant or 
applicable warrant exception, the evidence derived from this search will generally be 
inadmissible at trial.
6
   
The Fourth Amendment is technology-neutral. Its protections exist not to prevent 
some particular form of invasion, but to guarantee the substantive right against 
unreasonable search and seizure.
7
 This means that a Fourth Amendment standard should 
apply to new technology in a way that continues to reflect people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. Such a standard should both protect established Fourth 
Amendment rights and preserve the ability of law enforcement to investigate crimes. 
Current Fourth Amendment doctrine often fails to serve these interests. In particular, a 
test known as the third party doctrine, which very often governs searches of electronic 
                                                 
3
 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
4
 See Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
5
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
6
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011) (“[T]his Court created the exclusionary rule, a 
deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.”). 
7
 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
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information, generally holds that individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information held by or shared with third parties. For instance, the Supreme 
Court has held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers 
dialed on a telephone, as callers are aware this information is disclosed to the phone 
company.
8
 In his speech, Chief Justice Roberts was describing the goal of articulating a 
technology-neutral standard for solving novel Fourth Amendment problems. This will 
require revising and reconceptualizing Fourth Amendment law, including the third party 
doctrine. 
Changes to this legal standard will have a great impact on the privacy of citizen 
communications and personal information. This standard will determine how Americans’ 
electronic communications and information can be intercepted and surveilled by their 
government. The electronic information Justice Roberts referred to creates Fourth 
Amendment problems that implicate the First Amendment. Interpersonal 
communications, data revealing personal associations, and personal data electronically 
stored with a third party—akin to the Fourth Amendment’s protected “papers”—all 
implicate strong First Amendment interests. 
This thesis will address two central factors that courts must consider in creating a 
Fourth Amendment standard. First, Fourth Amendment law must apply in a technology-
neutral manner. To uphold the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, people must be free 
from unreasonable searches of their communications regardless of how they transmit or 
store information. Second, when addressing Fourth Amendment cases that involve 
                                                 
8
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
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technologies that can facilitate indiscriminate surveillance, courts must consider the 
chilling effect on lawful expression and conduct that this surveillance can impose.  
This thesis will then expand upon work by other scholars and endorse a 
technology-centered approach. This approach suggests that courts could analyze modern 
surveillance technologies by asking whether those technologies can facilitate broad and 
indiscriminate surveillance that invades reasonable expectations of privacy. It focuses 
directly on the aspects of modern surveillance that are quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from traditional law enforcement methods and which threaten to impose 
significant chilling effects. This approach recognizes that while the methods available to 
law enforcement must change with technology, the allowable incursions into citizens’ 
privacy should remain essentially the same. In other words, “the Fourth Amendment 
[should] permit access to that which technology hides,” but also “should protect that 
which technology exposes.”9 The technology-centered approach accomplishes this by 
focusing reform on the modern collection methods capable of exposing previously 
private or practically obscure information on a mass scale, while preserving human 
investigation methods that do not pose a similar threat. It provides a technology-neutral 
Fourth Amendment path forward, which maintains fundamental protections from 
government intrusion and protects against mass chilling effects, while preserving law 
enforcement’s ability to use traditional warrantless methods.  
 
                                                 
9
 Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580 (2009). 
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I.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the Fourth Amendment protections for 
electronic information, examine the First Amendment impacts of lawful U.S. 
surveillance, and propose a reformed theoretical framework for courts to apply to Fourth 
Amendment problems. This requires research on several elements of these issues. First:  
 
RQ1: How do courts determine when government information collection 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search of electronic information? 
RQ1a: What is the theoretical justification for distinguishing 
collection that constitutes a search from collection that does not? 
RQ1b: Do the tests applied by courts serve these theoretical 
justifications? 
 
Challenging the current Fourth Amendment doctrine requires a detailed analysis 
of its foundations. This section will explore how these foundations led to the third party 
doctrine as a method of solving Fourth Amendment problems and why this was viewed 
as a useful and necessary theory. It then will examine how this doctrine has been applied 
and whether its application has successfully served its theoretical justifications. 
 
RQ2: Are there First Amendment chilling effects created by the type of 
government surveillance current U.S. law permits? 
  6 
RQ2a: What are the chilling effects associated with pervasive, non-
politically targeted surveillance? 
RQ2b: How have changes in technology created chilling effects 
associated with surveillance? 
 
This research question focuses on how a legal doctrine incapable of recalibrating 
based on fundamental changes in the scope of surveillance can affect First Amendment 
rights. The goal is to focus specifically on the chilling effects caused by lawful U.S. 
government surveillance. This section aims to explore the ways in which modern 
technology has facilitated indiscriminate surveillance, and to integrate research on these 
changes with research on how surveillance chills First Amendment-protected activities. 
Only by scrutinizing the First Amendment concerns as carefully as, for instance, concerns 
about law enforcement overreach, can one make a Fourth Amendment reform proposal 
that genuinely balances these and other competing concerns. 
Next, the thesis will seek to answer the question posed by the critique of current 
doctrine and the examination of chilling effects: what is a superior alternative? 
Particularly, it will focus on the obstacles to creating a technology-neutral paradigm that 
protects First Amendment interests to the greatest extent possible while accommodating 
other considerations such as law enforcement effectiveness. The thesis will examine other 
proposals for new approaches and their strengths and weaknesses. Finally it will endorse 
a revised approach to solving these problems. 
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RQ3: How can courts create a technology-neutral standard for determining 
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred that protects First Amendment 
rights? 
RQ3a: What new or revised approaches have scholars proposed to 
determine when an electronic search has occurred? 
RQ3b: What principles can create a technology-neutral Fourth 
Amendment approach that minimizes First Amendment chilling effects 
while empowering the government to investigate crimes? 
 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL 
APPROACH 
 
a. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The third party doctrine is a legal test arising from this foundation that holds “that 
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”10 Under this doctrine, when the government collects information that 
was conveyed to a third party, it is generally not considered a Fourth Amendment 
search.
11
 This information can be collected without any Fourth Amendment constraint. 
Thus the government can collect information that has been willingly exposed to the 
public
12
 or information possessed by third parties such as communications companies
13
 
without a warrant. 
                                                 
10
 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44. 
11
 RICHARD THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1 
(2014). 
12
 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1988). 
13
 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44. 
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The third party doctrine, particularly as applied to electronic searches, has been 
the subject of much debate among legal scholars. George Washington University Law 
School Professor Orin Kerr is a prominent academic defender of the third party 
doctrine.
14
 His 2007 article The Case for the Third Party Doctrine made theoretical and 
pragmatic arguments in support of the doctrine.
15
 Kerr argued that the doctrine is 
technology-neutral because it prevents criminals from exploiting technology to gain 
greater Fourth Amendment protections.
16
 Also, Kerr argues, the doctrine provides a 
bright line rule needed on this issue to give law enforcement the operational clarity 
required for effective policing.
17
 His defense of the doctrine also spurred a public debate 
with several other Fourth Amendment scholars. In a 2009 Symposium Issue of the 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Professors Richard Epstein and Erin Murphy 
critiqued The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, and Professor Kerr responded in support 
of the doctrine.
18
 
However, the overwhelming majority of legal scholarship is critical of the 
doctrine. Critiques tend to focus on two major shortcomings. First, it does not reflect 
citizens’ subjective expectations of privacy and is therefore not consistent with basic 
                                                 
14
 Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. BULL. 39, 44 (2011); Julian Sanchez, The Talking Points for NSA’s Dragnet Don’t Hold Up, CATO 
INSTITUTE (July 24, 2013), http://www.cato.org/blog/talking-points-nsas-dragnet-dont-hold. 
15
 The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 9. 
16
 Id. at 573. 
17
 Id. at 581. 
18
 Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable 
Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-
Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, 
Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229 
(2009). 
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Fourth Amendment principles.
19
 This first critique is supported by several different 
arguments. Many argue that the third party doctrine is based on the flawed premise that 
privacy is a binary concept that is waived when disclosed to another party.
20
 In other 
words, it is unacceptable to “treat[] exposure to a limited audience as identical to 
exposure to the world.”21Another argument is that because of changes in technology, the 
decision to reveal information to third parties is often not sufficiently voluntary to justify 
its use as a waiver of privacy rights over that information.
22
 For instance, Vanderbilt 
University Law School Professor Christopher Slobogin argued that under the third party 
doctrine, it could be necessary for an individual to refuse educational or medical 
advances because they may expose personal information to third parties, an irrational and 
potentially harmful result.
23
  
The second major critique is that the doctrine justifies an unacceptable level of 
government intrusion. As changes in technology expose much more of people’s 
information to third parties, many scholars have made normative arguments that 
particular collection methods permitted by the third party doctrine are sufficiently 
intrusive to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Some scholars focus on the 
problematic consequences of allowing particular collection methods such as cell phone 
                                                 
19
 See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (2013). 
20
 See, e.g., Susan Brenner & Leo Clarke, Fourth Amendment for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored 
Transactional Data, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 211, 258 (2006). 
21
 Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some 
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002). 
22
 See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Katz on A Hot Tin Roof-Saving the Fourth Amendment from Commercial 
Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 343 
(2013). 
23
 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 156 (2007). 
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location tracking
24
 or communication over social media
25
 to undermine the third party 
doctrine more generally. Others have argued that although the third party doctrine may be 
viable as applied to traditional collection methods, it must be interpreted differently with 
respect to Internet communication.
26
  
However, critiques are much more common than solutions.
27
 This thesis will 
closely examine several proposed paradigms intended to replace the third party doctrine, 
as these will demonstrate both the template for and difficulties of proposing such a 
solution. For instance, Mosaic Theory is the recent Fourth Amendment reform proposal 
that has gained the most traction with scholars
28
 and courts.
29
 The premise of Mosaic 
Theory is that information collected through means not considered a Fourth Amendment 
“search” nevertheless may constitute a search when large data sets are aggregated to 
create a revealing “mosaic” of a person’s life.30 David Gray & Danielle Citron’s article 
The Right to Quantitative Privacy provides a proposal based on technology-centered 
approach.
31
 This approach would determine whether the use of a surveillance technology 
constitutes a search by asking whether it has the capability to facilitate broad, 
                                                 
24
  Michael T.E. Kalis, Ill Suited to the Digital Age: Fourth Amendment Exceptions and Cell Site Location 
Information Surveillance, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 1 (2013). 
25
 Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
26
 Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1403 
(2004). 
27
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 1251 (“So if I want some kind of constitutional third-party 
protection, and I recognize that it cannot simply be contiguous with the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights, then how might I imagine the doctrine? Truthfully, I have no idea.”). 
28
 See, e.g, Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in 
the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 738-44 (2011); Jace Gatewood, District of Columbia Jones 
and the Mosaic Theory-in Search of A Public Right of Privacy: The Equilibrium Effect of the Mosaic 
Theory, 92 NEB. L. REV. 504 (2014). 
29
 See infra Part IV.a. 
30
 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
31
 David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013). 
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indiscriminate surveillance.
32
 Daniel Solove’s The First Amendment as Criminal 
Procedure provides another perspective, seeking to expand protections against subpoenas 
based on the information’s First Amendment value, rather than expanding the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment as many other scholars have proposed.
33
  
 
b. ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
particularly the third party doctrine. It will demonstrate that although the doctrine arose 
from reasonable decisions given the contemporaneous technology and the facts at issue, it 
is a limited, technology-specific solution for Fourth Amendment problems. Specific 
attention will be paid to the logic of its application to new technologies. In some cases, 
the justifications for the third party doctrine are strong and serve the intended interests, 
but in other cases, they fail to serve these interests. This section will also demonstrate the 
crucial weaknesses of the third party doctrine, which have led to several recent decisions 
which rejected the third party doctrine as applied to the facts of the case. The third party 
doctrine creates problematic results by basing analysis on technological details of 
communication rather than the consequences of an unreasonable search. In these cases 
and as applied to emerging technologies, the third party doctrine fails as a technology-
neutral solution to Fourth Amendment problems. 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 69. 
33
 Daniel Solove, The First Amendment As Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 112 (2007). 
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One of the cases often cited as categorically establishing the third party doctrine is 
Smith v. Maryland.
34
 In Smith, a man was suspected of robbing a woman’s home and 
placing harassing phone calls to her. The Supreme Court ruled that law enforcement use 
of a pen register, which tracks the numbers dialed from the suspect’s phone, did not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search of the caller’s home.35 The Court ruled that 
because the suspect should have been aware that the third party telephone company 
recorded his dialed calls, he could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
information.
36
  
In Smith and many other cases following the doctrine, no Fourth Amendment 
search took place and the court correctly upheld the warrantless collection. The result was 
justified, but the reasoning—that based on an analogy to a pen register, there is no 
expectation of privacy in any information shared with a third party—is deeply flawed. 
The outcome in Smith was correct. But the reasoning of the third party doctrine is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, and that has been steadily revealed by the 
progression of technology. The categorical rule from Smith creates aberrant and 
unreasonable results when applied to collection using different technology. The third 
party doctrine has been the target of scholarly criticism almost since its inception.
37
 But, 
as explored above, scholars and courts have struggled to create a viable alternative.
38
 
                                                 
34
 THOMPSON, supra note 11. 
35
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
36
 Id. at 743. 
37
 See The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 9, at 563, fn. 5 (2009) (“A list of every article or 
book that has criticized the doctrine would make this the world's longest law review footnote.”). See, e.g., 
Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy”, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 
IND. L.J. 549, 564-66 (1990). 
38
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 1251. 
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With no clearly articulated alternative, courts have opted to adhere to the often arbitrary 
but definitive tool of the third party doctrine.  
In addition to analyzing the progression of Fourth Amendment doctrine, this 
section explores an indispensable aspect of any Fourth Amendment solution: technology-
neutrality. This concept has been explored by influential Fourth Amendment scholar Orin 
Kerr who stated, “Katz effectively required technological neutrality.”39 Under this 
approach, protection of information should not be based on arbitrary distinctions between 
technologies. As an example, the facts from Smith can illustrate this approach. Police 
should have access to a tool like a pen register because the telephone allows for 
previously public, and therefore observable, criminal action to be committed purely in 
private. Traditionally, one would have had to travel public streets to harass another 
person in her home, which means that the police would be able to observe that travel and 
potentially gather probable cause to obtain a search warrant. However, technology 
allowed the defendant to harass over the phone, rather than travelling to her home. In 
other words, a pen register allowed law enforcement to gather information analogous to 
what would have been accessible without a warrant before the telephone existed. To bar 
law enforcement from collecting such information would threaten to prevent police 
officers from collecting the type of information necessary to make a showing of probable 
cause to obtain of a warrant.
40
 The Constitution is not a promise to handcuff law 
enforcement unnecessarily to ineffective methods.  
                                                 
39
 The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 9, at 580. 
40
 This analogy is explored further in Professor Orin Kerr’s analysis of Smith. Id. at 577-78. 
  14 
This is an example of how Kerr argued that the third party doctrine is technology 
neutral.
41
 A technology-neutral approach focuses on the substitution effect of 
technology.
42
 Although the mechanism of new methods of communication or information 
storage may be completely novel, their function often resembles the technology of the 
past. This approach recognizes that while the methods available to law enforcement must 
change with technology, the allowable incursions into citizens’ privacy should stay 
essentially the same. In other words, “the Fourth Amendment [should] permit access to 
that which technology hides,” but also “should protect that which technology exposes.”43 
The third party doctrine is an arbitrary and misguided tool to navigate this distinction.  
Part one of this section will introduce the foundations of Fourth Amendment law 
as applied to communications and explore how past courts have attempted to create 
technology-neutral tests. Part two will provide an overview of the development of the 
third party doctrine, summarizing the reasoning of these precedents to demonstrate how 
the Court arrived at the categorical declaration in Smith that information shared with a 
third party was outside Fourth Amendment protection. Part three will examine the 
reasoning of recent cases that have questioned the viability of the third party doctrine. As 
lower courts and the Supreme Court reconsider this bright line approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, and privacy decisions in other contexts challenge some of the doctrine’s 
underlying assumptions, is the third party doctrine a sufficient and coherent constitutional 
safeguard?  
                                                 
41
 Id. at 580. 
42
 For more on “substitution effects,” see id. at 577. But see Blake Ellis Reid, Substitution Effects: A 
Problematic Justification for the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 613, 614 (2010). 
43
 The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 9, at 580. 
  15 
 
i. Foundations of the Fourth Amendment 
In Anglo-American law, the rights of free expression and freedom from 
government searches are inextricably linked. In 18
th
 century England, the push for rights 
against arbitrary government searches began in response to the press licensing system and 
the conferment of immense authority to those enforcing it.
44
 The first cases rejecting the 
King’s right to search a home without justification concerned searches of publishers.45 In 
the foundational case Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, the court 
rejected the validity of a general warrant targeting a publisher of a political pamphlet and 
framed the protection from government search as necessary to protect speech.
46
 Lord 
Camden wrote that if the warrantless searches were upheld, “the secret cabinets and 
bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection 
of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to 
suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.”47 
 In the American colonies, many residents agitated against a particular type of 
general warrant: the writ of assistance.
48
 These writs empowered representatives of the 
Crown to conduct broad warrantless searches at their discretion, and a writ was valid for 
the lifespan of the King.
49
 After the revolutionary war, the framers of the Bill of Rights 
                                                 
44
 F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND: 1476-1776, 173-76 (1952). 
45
 M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 910-11 (2010). 
46
 19 HOW. ST. TRI. 1029 (1765). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Michael, supra note 45, at 911. 
49
 Id. at 908. 
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sought to restrict government power and the Fourth Amendment was designed to “ban 
general warrants and writs of assistance.”50  
 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has always been informed by this history. After 
the Fourth Amendment “remained for almost a century a largely unexplored territory,”51 
the Supreme Court confronted a warrantless search of personal papers in 1886 case U.S. 
v. Boyd. The Court recounted the history leading to the Fourth Amendment, including the 
protests against writs of assistance and the press rights at issue in Entick.
52
 It then 
expounded upon the values of the Fourth Amendment, derived from this history. “It is not 
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence 
of the offense,” Justice Bradly wrote. Rather the Fourth Amendment created a broader 
right against “the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty 
and private property.”53 Bradley concluded, “[I]t is the invasion of this sacred right which 
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgment [in Entick].”54 The 
Boyd Court relied on the history of arbitrary searches used to target dissidents to explicate 
the values of personal privacy and liberty the Fourth Amendment protected.  
In 1928, the Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. United States, its first major case 
confronting electronic surveillance. Olmstead is the “first decision” on the 
constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps that Chief Justice Roberts referred to in his 
speech and a foundational Fourth Amendment case. In this case, a criminal defendant 
whose telephone communications were recorded by law enforcement argued that this 
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evidence should be suppressed because the collection violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.
55
 A majority of the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the collection 
occurred through the tapping of telephone lines located outside of the defendant’s 
property.
56
 The government had not trespassed on the defendant’s property in performing 
the relatively new method of collecting electronic, rather than physical, information. The 
Court held that for the Fourth Amendment to apply, the government must commit a 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space.
57
 Thus, the Court rejected the 
argument that a warrantless wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment.
58
 Justice Brandeis 
challenged this property-based approach in his dissent, arguing that it adopted a 
dangerously narrow understanding of Fourth Amendment Protection.
59
 
In particular, Brandeis warned of interpreting constitutional protections, such as 
those enumerated in the Fourth Amendment, in a way that limits their applicability to the 
problems of the past.
60
 He reckoned back to the nation’s founding to underscore the 
gravity of the threat, writing, “As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general 
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
tapping.”61 He argued that when constitutional protections are formulated based only on 
traditional threats to liberty, courts sacrifice meaningful protection in the name of 
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decisional clarity.
62
 Brandeis wrote that the constitution’s protections must apply not only 
to “what has been but [to] what may be. Under any other rule a Constitution would 
indeed be as easy [to apply] as it would be deficient in efficacy and power.”63 Instead, 
Brandeis argued, the Court had no option but to do the difficult work of applying past 
principles to new problems, because without this forward-looking philosophy, “rights 
declared in words might be lost in reality.”64  
In Olmstead, this meant applying a theory of the Fourth Amendment that 
accounted for new technology. Brandeis concluded that any such theory must be defined 
by the effect of the intrusion, not its form.
65
  Brandeis cited Ex Parte Jackson, an 1878 
case in which the Court ruled that the government needed a warrant to open and examine 
the contents of a sealed envelope in the mail.
66
 In Jackson, the Court reasoned that 
because the government could not search letters carried by individuals without a warrant, 
it would be unjust to allow the warrantless search of sealed letters in the mail, simply 
because they were entrusted to the postal service, an arm of the government.
67
 Because of 
the parallel function of the postal service and the personal courier, sealed letters handled 
by either service were subject to the same warrant requirement.
68
 Thus, law enforcement 
could inspect the outside of an envelope with impunity, but inspecting its contents 
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required a warrant.
69
 Comparing the wire taps at issue in Olmstead with the interception 
of the contents of mail, Brandeis explored the implications of a technology-neutral 
approach.
70
 Of telephone conversations and mail, he wrote, “True, the one is visible, the 
other invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is sealed, and the other 
unsealed; but these are distinctions without a difference.”71 The many technical 
distinctions that could be drawn between the two technologies were irrelevant in the face 
of one commonality: each facilitated private personal conversations between individuals. 
Brandeis’ reasoning demanded a technology-neutral approach to the Fourth Amendment 
focused on the technology at issue and the effect of the invasion, not the practical method 
of a government invasion. 
Brandeis’s approach was echoed by a majority of the Supreme Court almost four 
decades later. Between 1928 and 1967, the number of U.S. households with a telephone 
more than doubled, from less than 40% to almost 90%, and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding this technology evolved.
72
 In Berger v. New York, the Court held 
that a wiretap on a private phone constituted an intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area, deciding on the basis of the Olmstead majority’s protected area doctrine that the 
physical intrusion necessary for the wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment.
73
 Later that 
year in Katz v. United States, it overruled the protected area theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, finding that Fourth Amendment protection applied even to a conversation in 
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a public phone booth.
74
 The “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” the Court 
found.
75
 It emphasized that Fourth Amendment protection did not hinge on whether a 
phone booth was a “constitutionally protected area” or minute details like whether a 
government-employed lip reader could have observed the defendant’s statements.76  
Defendant Katz’s constitutional rights were violated because the government obtained his 
communications, in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, without a 
warrant.
77
 After Katz, to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred, 
courts were now to ask, first, if the individual had an expectation of privacy and second, 
if that expectation was one society recognized as reasonable.
78
 Under this test, Katz could 
reasonably expect his telephone conversation in a public phone booth to be private.
79
  
As Brandeis had in Olmstead, the Court emphasized the function of the 
communication, rather than the medium through which it occurred. “To read the 
Constitution,” as allowing warrantless collection of a telephone call merely because it 
occurred on a public space “is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come 
to play in private communication.”80 The Court did not dispute that the conversation 
occurred in a portion of the public space, but allowing warrantless interception would not 
comport with the historically protected nature of private conversation.
81
 The Court found 
that Katz could reasonably “assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not 
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be broadcast to the world.”82 The Court explicitly held that the decision overruled 
“Olmstead v. United States which essentially rested on the ground that conversations 
were not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”83  
In Katz, the Court reconceptualized its approach to what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment “search.” Changes in technology had made a previously valid approach 
incapable of serving the role for which the Fourth Amendment was created. The Court 
recognized that the potential for electronic surveillance made the trespass-based approach 
insufficient to preserve the rights of citizens to exclude the state from his or her private 
affairs. It instead designed a technology-neutral standard based on reasonable 
expectations of privacy.   
 
ii. Development of the Third Party Doctrine 
The third party doctrine has its roots in undercover agent cases beginning in the 
1950s.
84
 In Lee v. United States, an undercover informant wore a hidden microphone to 
record the defendant’s statements without his knowledge.85 The Court recognized that 
Lee had chosen to speak confidentially with someone he trusted but had therefore opened 
himself to the possibility that that person would betray his trust.
86
 Therefore Fourth 
Amendment protection did not attach.
87
 In Hoffa v. United States, the Court affirmed the 
Lee Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment need not protect “a wrongdoer’s 
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misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it.”88  
These decisions were made before Katz fundamentally shifted the focus on Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to expectations of privacy. However, after Katz, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the admissibility of conversations secretly recorded by one of the parties based 
on a speaker’s assumption of risk. In United States v. White, the majority found that 
society could not recognize a criminal’s expectation that her companion would keep a 
conversation private as a reasonable one.
89
 Under the Fourth Amendment, a person who 
has a private conversation assumes the risk that her partner chooses to lawfully record it 
for law enforcement use.
90
 This line of cases stands for the proposition that when a 
conversation between two people is recorded by one of them, it is generally not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. This is an important precedent that helped courts 
create the third party doctrine, which many courts have justified through an assumption 
of risk approach similar to these undercover agent cases.
91
  
A few years later, when the Supreme Court confronted cases concerning the 
government collection of business records, it based its analysis on the undercover agent 
cases.
92
 In these cases, the Court reasoned that for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, transferring business records to a third party represented an assumption of 
risk similar to having a private conversation. Therefore government interception of these 
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records would not constitute a “search” under to the Fourth Amendment.93 In U.S. v. 
Miller, the Court held that just as in a conversation, a bank depositor “takes the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government.”94 In addition, the Court noted that the records did not document private 
matters, but rather financial records shared in the ordinary course of business. Thus the 
Fourth Amendment did not restrict the warrantless acquisition of such business records. 
Next, the Court addressed the constitutional status of telephone metadata in Smith 
v. Maryland.
95
 Police suspected that Smith had robbed a woman and was making 
harassing phone calls to her home.
96
 The police asked the phone company to install a pen 
register on Smith’s phone line, without a warrant.97 The first day that the pen register was 
installed, it documented data on a call from Smith’s phone to the female victim’s phone, 
and the police used this information to obtain a search warrant and eventually arrest 
Smith.
98
 The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether Smith “had a ‘legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers dialed on his phone.”99 Based on several 
factors, such as that the numbers dialed are reproduced on a customer’s monthly bill, the 
Court found that a reasonable consumer would be aware that the companies record that 
data.
100
 And based on its previous third party doctrine holdings, the Court found that this 
awareness meant that a suspect could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
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numbers he dialed.
101
 By “expos[ing]” that information to the phone company, Smith 
“assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”102 
In Smith, the Court made the sweeping claim that “[t]his Court consistently has 
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”103 But the Court’s efforts to tie this finding to the 
analogy of sharing one’s information with a person reveal some consideration of the 
function of the communication. The majority held that “[t]he switching equipment that 
processed those numbers [was] merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an 
earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”104 Just as the recording 
devices in the undercover agent cases were merely a more reliable way of recording 
evidence than having the agent recount the conversation to authorities, the pen register 
was a stand-in for information that previously would have been revealed to a human 
operator.
105
 Because it was already established that it did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search when one party to a conversation recorded it, by analogy, there was 
no such right over the information communicated in a “conversation” with a pen register. 
The Court concluded that it would be inconsistent with precedent “to hold that a different 
                                                 
101
 Id. at 744. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. at 743-44. 
104
 Id. at 744.  
105
 Id. at 744-45 (“The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart 
of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes 
that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We 
are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone company has 
decided to automate.”). 
  25 
constitutional result is required because the telephone company has decided to 
automate.”106  
 
iii. Modern Courts Challenge the Third Party Doctrine 
 
In Klayman v. Obama, U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon, of the District of 
Washington, D.C., explicitly rejected the third party doctrine as articulated in Smith.
107
 At 
issue in Klayman was the National Security Agency’s (NSA) telephone metadata 
collection program, through which the U.S. government warrantlessly collected millions 
of Americans’ call record information in bulk from telephone companies.108 In June 
2013, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified documents revealing a 
variety of secret surveillance programs, including the telephone metadata collection 
program.
109
 The leaks triggered worldwide debate about the scope of U.S. government 
surveillance, and provided the foundation for several legal challenges, including the 
Klayman case.
110
  
Ruling on a preliminary injunction regarding the metadata collection program, 
Judge Leon found that “present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA 
and telecom companies” had so significantly changed from the past that Smith did not 
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control.
111
 The decision found a high likelihood that this collection program violated the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and thus granted the preliminary injunction.112 Leon 
ruled that although Smith held that a citizen does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her telephone metadata as to a limited, short-term search, the NSA’s 
continuous and indiscriminate collection of all telephone metadata constituted a 
qualitatively different Fourth Amendment issue.
113
 Judge Leon also found that modern 
cell phone usage meant that telephone metadata “‘reflects a wealth of detail about … 
familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations’ … that could not have 
been gleaned from a data collection in 1979.”114 Thus, the suspicionless metadata 
collection was the type of intrusion the Fourth Amendment was meant to guard against 
and therefore the metadata program violated citizens’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
115
 
Leon’s decision was highly controversial.116 Beyond its intelligence and law 
enforcement ramifications, some questioned a District Court Judge’s decision to reject 
what many considered a straightforward application of Supreme Court precedent from 
Smith.
117
 But regardless of whether Leon showed appropriate judicial deference, the 
decision built upon a growing body of cases that grappled with, and questioned the 
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validity of, the growing privacy implications of applying the third party doctrine to many 
new technologies. In recent cases, U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have declined to extend 
the doctrine to new circumstances and the Supreme Court has challenged the viability of 
the doctrine as applied to new technology. Using Judge Leon’s firm repudiation of the 
doctrine as a starting point, this section will examine the evolution of judicial challenges 
to the third party doctrine. 
 
1. United States v. Jones 
In 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment when it installed a small GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car and 
tracked his location for more than four weeks.
118
 The five Justice majority in Jones 
concluded that because the government had physically invaded a constitutionally-
protected space (the suspect’s car), the warrantless search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. It did not reach the separate—and arguably more important—question of 
whether the GPS tracking violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy.119 
Nevertheless, separate concurring opinions joined by five Justices rejected the core of the 
third party doctrine. 
The facts of Jones do not precisely implicate the third party doctrine, but rather a 
closely related principle that “What a person knowingly exposes to the public … is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”120 However these doctrines are interrelated 
and operate on many of the same assumptions, and in the context of GPS data, which 
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could be recorded by an attached device as in Jones or acquired from car or phone 
companies already collecting it, the doctrines may very well overlap. Moreover, the same 
technological developments that the concurring Justices confronted in Jones are those 
that challenge the third party doctrine, such as the development of technology recording 
and organizing massive amounts of data not previously thought to be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. And finally, Justice Sotomayor’s statement in Jones that “it may be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” reveals the degree to which 
the Justices understood that their discussion was equally applicable whether the 
government justified the warrantless collection of data under the public observation 
doctrine or the third party doctrine.
121
 In fact, much third party doctrine scholarship 
actually treats the facts of Jones as being directly on-point.
122
  
Although Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, her separate concurring 
opinion argued that in a future case, the Court would need to overturn the third party 
doctrine.
123
 Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito’s concurrence that long term GPS 
tracking triggers Fourth Amendment protection.
124
  Her opinion also discussed how 
changes in technology have created the potential for large scale tracking of other types of 
information, such as Internet activity, purchases and telephone metadata, over which 
people often have a subjective expectation of privacy.
125
 She wrote that for society to 
                                                 
121
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
122
 See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 28, at 738-44 (discussing the implications of Maynard). 
123
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
124
 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
125
 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
  29 
recognize these expectations as reasonable, the third party doctrine must be overturned.
126
 
Sotomayor found, “[W]hatever the societal expectations, [sensitive information shared 
with third parties] can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would 
not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” 127  
These statements reject the third party doctrine as a decisive factor in Fourth 
Amendment analysis. Disclosure of information to third parties is, of course, relevant to 
one’s expectation of privacy in it. But the third party doctrine commands precisely what 
Sotomayor rejects: that mere disclosure of information to third parties strips it of Fourth 
Amendment protection for that reason alone. Sotomayor’s individual concurrence was 
the most explicit rejection of the third party doctrine, but her reasoning and inevitable 
conclusion were mirrored by the four other concurring Justices. 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three other Justices, challenged 
assumptions intrinsic to the third party doctrine. Alito stated that “the use of longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”128 The fact that each data point of Jones’ location on public streets was revealed 
voluntarily to the public contemporaneously does not mean that he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in four weeks of location data.
129
 The concurrence declined to 
“identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, 
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for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”130 In other words, Alito rejects 
the premise that a citizen cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a collection 
of publicly available data, where the individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in any individual data point. This notion of privacy is a repudiation of the third party 
doctrine, at least its full application: that individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in any information disclosed to third parties.  
For Alito, recent technological changes have Fourth Amendment significance. In 
the past, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but 
practical.” GPS devices make the type of long-term location surveillance performed in 
Jones “relatively easy and cheap.”131 However until the quite recent past, such tracking 
would have been “difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”132 Now that 
technology has eliminated many of the practical bars to invasions of privacy, Alito 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment must play a different role in restricting the 
government. 
This reasoning is reflective of the technology-neutral approach applied by 
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead and by the majority in Katz. Rather than looking at the 
form of surveillance and analogizing it to a similar form from the past, Alito’s 
concurrence looked at the effect of the surveillance and attempted to analogize it to a 
practice with a similar effect from the past. As an example, the GPS location data in 
Jones is quite similar to the information that a police officer could gather by observing a 
car on a public street. But Brandeis and the Katz majority understood that although a 
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wiretap’s form of intrusion was most analogous to mere observation without invading a 
suspect’s home, the effect of a wiretap was most analogous to the very types of searches 
through “papers and effects”133 that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent. In 
Jones, the Alito concurrence recognized a similar historical inflection point, a time when 
the Court had to reconcile the divergence of two strands of a doctrine. Analogy to form 
pointed in one direction. Analogy to effect pointed in the other. In keeping with the 
foundational Fourth Amendment precedents, Alito put aside the formalistic commands of 
the third party doctrine and focused on the effect of the surveillance, which, in his view, 
amounted to a Fourth Amendment search. Although Alito declined to establish a clear 
Fourth Amendment rule in this case, he concluded that “the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”134 
Five Supreme Court Justices advocated in Jones for an understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment that would require a warrant for the collection of some types of 
information voluntarily shared with the public. This principle is inconsistent with the 
third party doctrine. And the four majority Justices who did not sign onto one of those 
opinions did not reject this premise, but rather did not reach the question. To argue that 
the Court is questioning the doctrine would understate the opinions expressed in Jones. 
Regardless of the degree to which future opinions may weigh disclosure to a third party 
as grounds for finding no reasonable expectation of privacy, the idea that “a person has 
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no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties”135 cannot be squared with the ideas expressed by five Justices in Jones. 
 
2. Mosaic Theory and Replacement Effects 
The concurrences in Jones focused on a particular weakness in the third party 
doctrine. The Justices questioned the premise that exposing one data point to the public 
means that there can be no privacy interest when the government collects a large amount 
of that data in a novel way. The idea that a collection of non-private information can 
implicate privacy interests is well represented in Supreme Court precedent, and some 
lower courts have found it controlling in the Fourth Amendment context. Within these 
cases, the reasoning reveals a decision by courts to reason based on the effect of the 
information rather than the technical details of how it was collected. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a person maintains a significant privacy 
interest even in information that has been voluntarily revealed by third parties. U.S. Dept. 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press concerned the release of FBI 
rap sheets through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
136
 The rap sheets 
consisted of a computerized aggregation of publicly available arrest information about an 
individual.
137
 In finding that individuals had a privacy interest in the rap sheets, the Court 
stated, “In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another 
divulged to another.”138 The Court rejected a “cramped notion of personal privacy” that 
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would deny a right to privacy in a large collection of personal information on the grounds 
the each element of it was already publicly available.
139
 “Plainly there is a vast difference 
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, 
county archives, and local police stations throughout the county and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”140 The Court recognized that 
the “practical obscurity” of information could, in some cases, support a reasonable belief 
that the information was private.  
Although the Court was interpreting FOIA, and therefore the decision is not 
controlling in Fourth Amendment decisions, its reasoning does challenge the basic 
assumptions of the third party doctrine. The Supreme Court rejected the premise that 
public availability of information vitiated any expectation of privacy in Reporters 
Committee. Its factual basis for doing so is no less valid in the Fourth Amendment 
context. Even in 1989, the Court found, “Hardly anyone in our society can keep 
altogether secret very many facts about himself. Almost every such fact, however 
personal or sensitive is known to someone else. Meaningful discussion of privacy, 
therefore, requires the recognition that ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total 
nondisclosure but with an interest in selective disclosure.”141 Although Reporters 
Committee did not raise a Fourth Amendment issue, it demonstrates that the Court has 
recognized a common sense distinction between a set of disparate and unconnected 
information and a cohesive and easily accessible compilation of that same information.  
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The ideas explored in Reporters Committee, particularly the idea that “practical 
obscurity” of information can in some instances create a reasonable belief that the 
information in private, have been applied by other courts in the Fourth Amendment 
context, under the title “Mosaic Theory.” Mosaic Theory generally refers to the idea that 
“even apparently innocuous information could be harmful if pieced together by a 
knowledgeable observer.”142 This term has been used in many contexts, including by the 
federal government to justify non-disclosure of unclassified documents requested under 
FOIA, on the theory that when combined and analyzed, they could threaten national 
security.
143
 In Fourth Amendment analysis, it posits that, “The critical question … is 
whether the collection of personal information aggregated by officers during a given 
investigation violates reasonable expectations of privacy.”144 
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit found that the warrantless search of 
approximately 27,000 emails violated a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even 
though the emails were stored by a third party service provider.
145
 By 2010, email had 
become an indispensable form of communication, and the Court noted, “Since the advent 
of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned in importance, and an explosion of 
Internet-based communication has taken place.”146 The Court began its examination of 
the Fourth Amendment interests at stake with the “bedrock principle” announced by the 
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Supreme Court in Kyllo that “evolving technology must not be permitted to ‘erode the 
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.’”147 
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s precedents with regard to mail and telephone 
conversations, the Sixth Circuit engaged in a function-based analysis of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in email messages. It cited protection for the contents 
of mail and that “Katz has … come to stand for the broad proposition that, in many 
contexts, the government infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy when it 
surreptitiously intercepts a telephone call through electronic means.”148 So, the court 
reasoned, “Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of 
communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment 
protection.”149 It explained that it would defy reasonable expectations of privacy to insist 
that a new form of communication serving a very similar purpose as an older one 
receives different protection based solely on the technical details of communication. “As 
some forms of communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize 
and protect nascent ones that arise.”150 Warshak held that the Fourth Amendment requires 
a technology-neutral approach and that the function of an emerging technology can 
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provide the basis for analogizing to established mediums to define a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
151
 
In U.S. v. Maynard, later heard on appeal by the Supreme Court as U.S. v. Jones, 
the D.C. Circuit explicitly embraced the Mosaic Theory.
152
 As discussed above, the 
police had attached a GPS device to a suspect’s car which recorded location data for over 
four weeks. The D.C. Circuit noted that in United States v. Knotts, “the [Supreme] Court 
specifically reserved the question whether a warrant would be required in a case 
involving ‘twenty-four hour surveillance,’ stating ‘if such dragnet-type law enforcement 
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then 
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.’”153 The D.C. 
Circuit found that the privacy interest in the Knotts short-term GPS tracking situation was 
constitutionally distinguishable from the long-term tracking at issue in Maynard. Citing  
Reporters Committee, the court held that “[t]he whole of one's movements over the 
course of a month . . . like a rap sheet . . . reveals far more than the individual movements 
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it comprises.”154 The fact that the suspect’s location could, at any time within those four 
weeks, have been observed by a police officer without a warrant, is not dispositive of the 
existence of a Fourth Amendment search. “A reasonable person does not expect anyone 
to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, 
destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each 
of those movements to remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”155 Although it was 
affirmed based on different reasoning by the Supreme Court in Jones, Maynard is an 
example of a very influential circuit court rejecting the third party doctrine.  
The decisions in Maynard, Warshak and Reporters Committee paved the way for 
five Justices of the Supreme Court to reject the basic assumptions of the third party 
doctrine in Jones. But upsetting the third party doctrine means something must replace it. 
Many have pointed out that for all its flaws, the doctrine gives courts a metric to make 
Fourth Amendment decisions. Mosaic Theory, although very important for its descriptive 
power and for addressing a central problem of the third party doctrine, gives courts little 
guidance on when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.  
 
c. SUMMARY 
The third party doctrine developed through a logical jurisprudential process, but it 
has important limitations. The doctrine was constructed by analogy from the idea that 
criminals assumed the risk that their comrades were wearing a wire. Each step applying 
the premise to new facts was derived from the idea that criminals could not hide behind 
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technology to suppress evidence that otherwise would have been obtainable through 
constitutionally sound law enforcement methods. From the conclusion that a suspect 
assumes the risk that a confidante will betray him, a later court reasoned that a suspect 
assumed that same risk when he entrusted records to a business. Similarly, the reasoning 
goes, a phone number that would otherwise have been shared with a human operator 
constitutes no greater a Fourth Amendment intrusion when recorded by a pen register 
instead. In this way, supporters of the third party doctrine have argued that it is 
technology-neutral.  
However, as one scholar noted, “[I]t is dubious to justify the Third Party Doctrine 
on the grounds of technological neutrality when technology causes ever more personal 
information to be subject to its vacuum.”156 And that is the contradiction of the argument 
that this doctrine is technology-neutral. It is technology-neutral in form, but not in effect. 
In other words, under the doctrine, across every medium and technology, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information transmitted to third parties. But for 
every new medium or technology, this may mean something completely different. To 
have no expectation of privacy in the information shared with a third party when sending 
a letter through the mail means that the government may collect the names, addresses and 
date on the envelope without a warrant. To have no expectation of privacy in the 
information shared with a third party when sending an email from a smart phone may 
mean the government may collect the names, addresses and time of sending, along with 
the content of the email, the sender’s exact location, IP address and more. What may have 
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been sent in a letter 50 years ago is now send in an email.
157
 But the effect of the third 
party doctrine is to make one of those expressions protected by the Fourth Amendment 
and one not. This is how the doctrine is technology-neutral in form, but not effect.  
Applying this doctrine to new technologies will often substitute strict adherence 
to a rule for consideration of its constitutional implications. Although Smith made a broad 
pronouncement of a legal rule, courts must recognize the technology-specific reasoning 
of that opinion. The conclusion in Smith can be reconciled with the implications for 
personal privacy raised by modern technology, but only through a technology-neutral 
doctrine rather than mechanical application of the third party doctrine. 
Those who defend the third party doctrine almost invariably point to one alleged 
strength: clarity of application. Putting aside the fact that clarity alone is a totally 
insufficient justification for defining constitutional rights,
158
 the doctrine does not provide 
such clarity. Proponents of the doctrine point out that the police need clarity about what 
they can and cannot search without a warrant, and conclude that the bright line 
distinctions of the third party doctrine provide this clarity.
159
 Although a full application 
of the doctrine would provide clarity, courts are confronting fact patterns, such as Jones 
and Warshak, in which the doctrine’s conclusions are simply too out of step with 
reasonable expectations to control the issue.
160
 Courts have therefore rejected the doctrine 
                                                 
157
 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Since the advent of email, the 
telephone call and the letter have waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication 
has taken place.”) 
158
 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“While clarity is 
certainly a value worthy of consideration in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it by no means trumps 
the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the Amendment's protections.”). 
159
 See, e.g., The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 379, at 581-83. 
160
 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of 
Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 642 (2011) (“Apparently aware of the sweeping implications of 
  40 
as applied to those facts. When courts refuse to adhere to the doctrine, law enforcement 
does not have the clarity promised by defenders of the doctrine. The third party doctrine 
simply cannot deliver the clarity its advocates promise in a technological environment so 
out of step with privacy expectations that courts refuse to adhere to it. The value of 
clarity is defeated if it is imposed by a test which courts cannot apply to the difficult 
cases. 
This section has provided some examples of Fourth Amendment problems created 
by emerging technology. As explored further below, such issues will continue to arise 
with increasing frequency.
161
 The third party doctrine was developed based on the 
premise that a reasonable person would understand that revealing information to a third 
party waived her privacy interest in it.
162
 Whether or not this ever was categorically true, 
the decisions in Jones, Warshak and other cases found it is no longer.  
The variety and complexity of technological forms through which people store 
and communicate information must change Fourth Amendment analysis. Courts can no 
longer place such immense importance on technical details of which many users may not 
even be aware.
163
 In cases such as Jones and Warshak, courts have looked to the past 
capabilities of law enforcement to evaluate where to draw the modern Fourth 
Amendment line. Specifically they considered how searches made possible by new 
technology compared in potential scope and invasiveness with older techniques. The 
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modern Fourth Amendment requires a technology-neutral solution which takes these 
considerations into account. 
 
III. CHILLING EFFECTS AND MODERN SURVEILLANCE 
a. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fourth Amendment doctrine creates the legal environment in which citizens 
exercise their First Amendment rights. When the government restricts First Amendment 
rights indirectly, it nonetheless burdens those rights, and courts have been particularly 
responsive to chilling effects on First Amendment rights.
164
 According to First 
Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer, “A chilling effect occurs when individuals 
seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from so 
doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”165  
This section explores the chilling effects associated with modern surveillance. In 
order to do so, it is necessary to define the scope of that surveillance. Different forms of 
surveillance may impose different chilling effects. For instance, U.S government 
surveillance has evolved over the past century. After World War II, the Cold War-era 
government escalated programs of politically targeted surveillance. FBI investigations 
targeted civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr.
166
 and “the entire spectrum of 
[] social and labor movement[s] in the country.”167 These were not criminal 
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investigations but rather surveillance for “pure intelligence” purposes.168 After the 
Watergate and COINTELPRO scandals and the Church Committee report exploring and 
condemning the intelligence agencies’ abuses,169 U.S. policy shifted away from explicitly 
political targeted surveillance. 
In most cases, government surveillance for the sole purpose of recording political 
speech is banned in the U.S.  For instance, the Privacy Act generally restricts federal 
agencies from “describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment” unless they are “pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law 
enforcement activity.”170 Many legal authorities enabling surveillance, such as the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order 12333, also restrict the 
government’s ability to surveil people based on First Amendment-protected activities.171 
Although this does not mean that it does not take place, the government generally cannot 
target political expression except in the context of a legitimate law enforcement 
investigation.
172
 Below is a set of axes charting ideal types of government surveillance. 
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Figure A 
Government Surveillance Ideal Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the top-left quadrant are regimes using targeted, politically motivated 
surveillance. An example would be the FBI in the mid-20th century United States.
173
  In 
the bottom-left quadrant are regimes that perform little surveillance with low political 
targeting. An example would be early-2000s Greece, which according to a 2007 Privacy 
International/EPIC report conducted little surveillance and had significant safeguards 
against targeting in place.
174
  In the top-right quadrant are regimes that perform pervasive 
surveillance and use that surveillance to target political dissidents for further surveillance 
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or legal consequences. An example would be modern China.
175
  In the bottom-right 
quadrant are regimes that conduct pervasive surveillance and use that surveillance for 
non-political targeting purposes such as law enforcement and counterterrorism.  An 
example is the present-day United Kingdom.
176
    
Social science research has generally focused on the harms of targeted 
surveillance. First Amendment scholars have identified the damaging effects of 
surveillance targeting political dissidents or other nonconformist groups.
177
 Such 
surveillance imposes a number of societal harms, including discouraging unorthodox 
ideas and stigmatizing those associated with the surveillance.
178
  
 A foundational 1972 article entitled “Surveillance: The Social Science 
Perspective” stated, “Surveillance, in American society, is traditionally reserved for those 
individuals and groups which in some way are presumed to be engaged in illegitimate 
activities.”179 The effects of this type of surveillance are profound. Targeted surveillance 
redefines the targets as illegitimate, leading to several harmful consequences.
180
 It chills 
the targeted group and those who sympathize or identify with them by creating a fear of 
sanctions.
181
 Particularly where a regime is known to target political opposition, targeted 
surveillance can create both a reasonable fear of persecution and mark the target’s beliefs 
as officially disfavored. Such surveillance can stigmatize this group and what it stands 
                                                 
175
 See Rebecca MacKinnon, China’s “Networked Authoritarianism,” 22 J. DEMOCRACY 32 (2011). 
176
 See United Kingdom, OPEN NET INITIATIVE (Dec. 18, 2010), https://opennet.net/research/profiles/united-
kingdom. 
177
 See, e.g., Brian Krueger, Government Surveillance and Political Participation on the Internet, 23 SOC. 
SCI. COMPUTER REV. 439, 442 (2005). 
178
 Amory Starr, et al., The Impact of Surveillance on the Exercise of Political Rights: An Interdisciplinary 
Analysis 1998-2006, 31 QUALITATIVE SOC. 251, 255 (2008). 
179
 Frank Askin, Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59, 65 (1972).  
180
 Id. at 66.  
181
 Id. at 64. 
  45 
for, chilling others from exploring similar beliefs.
182
 It can also breed a broader societal 
intolerance for dissent, infecting the culture and leading to “citizen oppression of other 
citizens who were labeled non-conformists.”183 Scholars have documented surveillance 
chilling lawful political activities in places ranging from the USSR
184
 to Central 
America.
185
 By targeting political opponents, governments can achieve dual objectives of 
collecting information and suppressing opposition.  
 Legal exploration of chilling effects has also largely focused on targeted 
surveillance. Fear of targeted, political surveillance is well-documented in legal opinions 
and literature.  In 1972, the Supreme Court held that “[C]onstitutional protections become 
the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of 
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.”186 And in a 1963 case, it stated that protection 
against surveillance and resulting stigmatization is “all the more essential … where the 
challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their 
neighbors and the deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally 
enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more 
immediate and substantial.”187 The Court confronted the threat of surveillance as it then 
existed and this threat was primarily the targeted, stigmatic harms described above.  
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 Fourth Amendment scholarship has likewise focused on these types of harms. The 
focus has often been on the chilling effects caused by individual searches inflicting 
stigmatic harm.
188
 Many have also explored the harms surveillance can inflict on 
particular racial or religious groups. For example, one scholar found, “By targeting a 
particular race for surveillance, investigation, and interrogation, the government brands 
members of that race as discredited and inherently suspect.”189 This focus on targeted 
surveillance makes sense because, until the last few decades, searches were necessarily of 
an individual or a small group. When Fourth Amendment scholars have explored chilling 
effects, the harms are often conceptualized as being tied to improper retaliation.
190
  
However, these studies do not address key aspects about the current state of 
lawful U.S. surveillance. As technology changes in the ways explored further below, the 
nature of surveillance is changing.
191
 The ideal type and approximate reality of U.S. 
surveillance belongs in the bottom-right quadrant of the Figure A above, as pervasive, 
non-political surveillance.
192
  
This reveals an important gap in much of the commentary on surveillance. Much 
of the research tying politically-targeted surveillance to a chilling effect provides little 
information on key modern surveillance issues. Many of the harms most explored by 
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social scientists, courts and legal scholars are not relevant to pervasive surveillance, as 
this does not inflict stigmatic injuries. But this type of surveillance can cause other 
injuries and chill constitutionally protected acts in other ways. In order to inform legal 
choices, this section will evaluate what chilling effects are genuinely at stake when courts 
craft a modern Fourth Amendment standard. That is, how does pervasive, non-politically 
targeted surveillance chill First Amendment activities?  
This is not meant to suggest that there is no literature on pervasive surveillance. 
Both in scholarship and popular culture, pervasive surveillance has long been linked to 
suppression of expression. From Bentham’s panopticon193 to Orwell’s Big Brother,194 
there are salient examples of total surveillance as a powerful mechanism of deterrence 
and control.  
Some scholars have concluded that the legal possibility of indiscriminate 
surveillance creates a reasonable fear of that surveillance. As one scholar states, “Where 
such extensive surveillance occurs, or is reasonably feared, the potential for limiting 
speech is clear: ‘There is only one way to guard against [eavesdropping], and that is to 
keep one’s mouth shut on all occasions.’”195 This section will explore social science 
research on the chilling effects of indiscriminate surveillance in greater depth. It will 
analyze efforts to document these chilling effects of indiscriminate surveillance in 
experimental
196
 and real-world
197
 settings. It will then seek to examine consequences of 
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these effects in light of the massive changes in communication, data production and data 
storage in the last few decades.  
Finally, a great deal of the legal literature about First Amendment chilling effects 
relates to whether or not these chilling effects are sufficient to confer standing for 
plaintiffs to challenge surveillance practices. Standing doctrine is a limitation on federal 
courts derived from Article III of the constitution, requiring that courts hear only cases in 
which litigants have a true personal stake in the outcome based on a particularized injury 
in fact.
198
 In Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to U.S. Army 
surveillance at political meetings, but ruled that the chilling effects alleged by the 
plaintiffs did not constitute a judicially cognizable injury.
199
 The plaintiffs had not made a 
sufficiently certain “claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm.”200 Similarly, in Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Court held that plaintiffs 
alleging their expression was chilled by government surveillance of their international 
communication could not allege with sufficient certainty that they were being surveilled 
under the challenged laws.
201
  
These decisions have spurred a glut of literature evaluating the narrow legal 
question of whether such plaintiffs can ever establish standing and if so, in what 
circumstances. Articles criticizing Laird and Clapper have argued that these opinions 
failed to give proper weight to plaintiffs’ claims that surveillance did demonstrably and 
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concretely affect the exercise of their rights.
202
 Scholars have noted that surveillance is 
often conducted in secret and if plaintiffs cannot prove that they were surveilled 
individually, it may be impossible to challenge such programs. Neil Richards states, 
“Plaintiffs can only challenge secret government surveillance they can prove, but the 
government isn’t telling. Plaintiffs (and perhaps civil liberties) are out of luck.”203 
However, this scholarship addresses a different problem than the chilling effects issues 
explored in this thesis. Whether or not chilling effects create standing for plaintiffs to 
bring a case is a separate issue from how chilling effects should inform Fourth 
Amendment analysis in criminal cases. 
 
b. ANALYSIS 
This section seeks to demonstrate the significance of First Amendment chilling 
effects for Fourth Amendment law in several steps. First, it will show that Courts have 
recognized these effects are a significant threat to free expression. Second, it will make 
evident that Fourth Amendment law must be the basis for protecting against chilling 
effects. Third, it will examine the multidisciplinary research relevant to the First 
Amendment problems imposed by modern surveillance and explain how this research can 
inform Fourth Amendment law. And finally, it will demonstrate how the immense 
changes in technology, and the pace of those changes, have made pervasive surveillance 
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of far more aspects of people’s lives possible, making the potential chilling effects far 
greater than in the past. 
The Supreme Court has recognized how the protection of privacy is often a 
necessary condition for free expression. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the wiretap statute prohibiting disclosure of illegally intercepted communications 
violated the First Amendment as applied to a defendant publishing information of public 
concern who had not participated in the interception of the communication.
204
 The case 
required balancing two “interests of the highest order,” “protecting privacy and 
promoting speech.”205 Although the Court ruled that this publication could not be 
punished, each opinion recognized the central role of privacy in enhancing speech, and 
the harmful chilling effects that violations of privacy could impose.  
The plurality noted the speech interests on both sides of this issue. The wiretap 
law’s “restrictions are intended to protect [privacy], thereby ‘encouraging the uninhibited 
exchange of ideas and information among private parties.”206 The plurality specifically 
noted that fear of having one’s private communications intercepted can chill that First 
Amendment-protected speech. “In a democratic society privacy of communication is 
essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion 
that one’s speech is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such 
activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and 
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constructive ideas.”207 A realistic fear of surveillance, even where no surveillance is 
taking place, can squelch free thought and open communication. 
The concurring and dissenting opinions explored more deeply how chilling effects 
impact speech. Justice Breyer’s concurrence dubbed the wiretap law’s effort to safeguard 
private communications a “speech-enhancing” protection.208 He argued that privacy is a 
mechanism to overcome the natural reluctance to speak about personal or controversial 
issues.
209
 If privacy is not protected, these conversations may never take place.
210
 Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent addressed these chilling effects even more directly. Intrusions on 
private telephone conversations “chill[] the speech of millions of Americans who rely 
upon electronic technology to communicate each day.”211 This surveillance had the 
potential to chill private speech not because of the content of the speech, but because of 
the erosion to the speaker’s belief that she could communicate without being intercepted. 
The Bartnicki case presented a difficult fact pattern with persuasive First Amendment 
interests on both sides. The Court had to balance the right to communicate privately 
against the right of speakers to publish truthful information. Despite that the Court found 
the publication was protected, the opinions in that case documented the chilling effects 
imposed when people cannot feel secure in their private communications.  
The Supreme Court more recently recognized that chilling effects can and must be 
part of the equation in Fourth Amendment law. As Justice Sotomayor stated in Jones, 
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“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive 
freedoms.”212 This problem, she argued, could require a change in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, including revision of the third party doctrine.
213
 And in its 2014 decision in 
Riley v. California, the Court required a warrant to search cell phones incident to an 
arrest, citing Sotomayor’s concurrence for support.214 The Court observed that Internet 
search history and GPS location data could reveal significant, private information, and 
thus a warrantless search of this information required different Fourth Amendment 
analysis than the court had applied in the past.
215
 Although the situation in Riley, a search 
incident to an arrest, is not governed by the third party doctrine, this case reflects the 
Court’s recognition that the changing capabilities of technology have First Amendment 
and Fourth Amendment implications. 
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding standing in the context of chilling effects in 
no way undermines the importance of the issue as a matter of policy. These rulings do not 
state that the harm at issue is not significant or that it is not implicated by government 
actions. Rather, in these cases the plaintiffs simply had not stated a particularized, 
certainly impeding harm fairly traceable to government actions.
216
 Many policy debates 
present issues that do not create a case or controversy under Article III of the 
constitution.
217
 Cases denying standing should not be misinterpreted as denying the 
significance of chilling effects as a constitutional problem. Cases like Riley, Jones and 
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Bartnicki illustrate the Supreme Court’s recognition of the importance of chilling effects 
as a policy consideration. 
 
i. The Fourth Amendment as Guardian of the First 
Underlying the discussion of chilling effects is the more basic concept of how two 
sets of constitutional rights, freedom from unreasonable searches and freedom of 
expression, depend on each other. This section will focus on how the freedom from 
unreasonable searches has and must act as a guardian of free expression. As a result of 
the combination of technological development and legal decisions, Fourth Amendment 
law must play this role, or First Amendment rights will be eroded. 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
218
 decided by the Supreme Court in 1978, created a 
concept called the Coextensivity Doctrine.
219
 This is the idea the First Amendment 
protections given to private information are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment 
protections, meaning that a valid warrant cannot be challenged based on the First 
Amendment value on the information searched.
220
 This doctrine has profound 
consequences for First Amendment rights by essentially making the protection of those 
rights dependent on Fourth Amendment rights. 
In Zurcher, the Stanford University student newspaper challenged a search of its 
newsroom for photographs of protestors pursuant to a warrant.
221
 The Supreme Court 
confronted the question of whether the First Amendment interests at stake in the search of 
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a newsroom could override a properly issued search warrant supported by probable cause 
that the premises contained evidence of a crime, even where the occupier of the premises 
was not involved in the crime. The Court found that a probable cause-supported search 
warrant was sufficient to protect the First Amendment interests so long as the warrant 
requirements were met with “scrupulous exactitude.”222 “No more than this is required,” 
the Court held. “Properly administered, the preconditions for the warrant—probable 
cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and 
overall reasonableness—should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are 
assuredly threatened by warrants for search newspaper offices.” 223 The First Amendment 
rights at stake were protected by the warrant, and if the warrant was properly issued, the 
First Amendment provided no additional protection.
224
 According to one scholar, 
“Zurcher ultimately stands for the proposition that when First Amendment values are at 
stake, the Fourth Amendment, when properly applied, can adequately protect these values 
and no further safeguards are needed.”225 Although this sweeping proposition may not 
apply in all circumstances, Zurcher demonstrates how courts can understand Fourth 
Amendment protections as sufficient to protect First Amendment rights. 
In Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals expanded on the Coextensivity Doctrine. The court rejected a challenge by 
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journalists to collection of their phone metadata.
226
 Expanding on Zurcher, the court 
found that even collections methods that did not require a warrant approved by a neutral 
magistrate, such as collection of metadata, could not be challenged on First Amendment 
grounds if they comported with the Fourth Amendment. The majority held that “the First 
Amendment does not guarantee a journalist, or any other citizen, the freedom to collect 
information immune from [g]ood faith criminal investigation by means which accord 
with Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.”227 The D.C. Circuit went on to expound 
upon the relationship between First and Fourth Amendment protections. The court found 
that the Supreme Court, in cases such as Zurcher, had declared that “the First 
Amendment offers no procedural or substantive protections against good faith criminal 
investigative activity beyond that afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”228 
Although these cases rejected the First Amendment as an independent grounds to 
challenges searches, they were correctly decided and ultimately important in protecting 
First Amendment rights. First, creating this type of First Amendment attack on a search 
would do little for the rights of average citizens. These challenges were brought by media 
organizations. They represent an easily-segregable group which could make an argument 
on behalf of its rights. The plaintiffs in these cases sought a right based on their role as 
journalists that would require a greater showing of cause than would be required for 
surveillance of a private citizen.  
Another problem is that asking courts to consider the First Amendment value of 
the individual’s communications, rather than the medium more broadly, will not 
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adequately protect speech interests. Weighing a party’s First Amendment interests in 
surveillance information on a case-by-case basis is simply not a reasonable or effective 
method of protecting these rights. An example is instructive. Imagine that the police hope 
to surveil an organization they suspect is committing crimes. The police serve a third-
party subpoena for the organization’s email records. If the organization is not committing 
crimes, the police will likely find no pattern of suspicious emails. Although the collection 
may constitute an undue burden on this organization’s First Amendment rights, and the 
government’s ability to collect the emails without a warrant may chill expression, there is 
never any opportunity to challenge it. 
If the police do find a suspicious pattern and eventually use this evidence at trial, 
only then would those in the organization have an opportunity to challenge the collection 
of these records. Because this standard is evaluated on an individual case basis, the 
defendants would then be in a position of asking a judge to suppress relevant evidence 
against them in a criminal case, collected otherwise properly under the Fourth 
Amendment, based on its tendency to chill their First Amendment rights. Meanwhile, that 
same information is alleged to be demonstrative of their crimes. Rare indeed would be 
the judge who suppresses evidence of a crime based solely on the argument that such 
evidence is protected by the First Amendment. 
This process is very different from a normal suppression argument. In a standard 
Fourth Amendment suppression hearing, occurring only in the context of criminal 
proceedings against the defendant, the question is whether the government followed its 
own standards. In a Fourth Amendment suppression context, a party’s argument is 
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essentially “this type of information cannot be collected by the government in this way.” 
If the argument relied on the First Amendment value of the information to that individual, 
the argument is essentially “my information is particularly valuable and is entitled to 
heightened protection.” This difference illustrates the difficulty of relying on case by case 
First Amendment analysis.  
The Coextensivity Doctrine creates the compelling need for First Amendment 
values to inform Fourth Amendment analysis. The right to be free from unreasonable 
searches must encompass protection for freedom of expression, rather than forcing courts 
to exclude evidence based on independent First Amendment grounds. For reasons 
explored further below, modern surveillance creates different, greater and more pervasive 
chills on expression ever before. Unless courts consider these effects by crafting Fourth 
Amendment standards that take into account the impact of the standard on First 
Amendment interests, “[r]ights declared in words [may] be lost in reality.”229 
 
ii. Pervasive Surveillance Creates Chilling Effects 
Legal scholars must begin to make use of social science research on the effects of 
pervasive, non-political surveillance. Research demonstrates that these chilling effects 
can occur without the stigmatization effects relevant to targeted surveillance. 
Additionally, when people believe they are being watched, chilling effects can result 
regardless of whether they truly are. Other studies show that individuals’ expression and 
even thoughts can be altered by the threat of surveillance, regardless of whether there is 
any punishment truly at stake. When surveillance of an activity is or legally could be 
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pervasive in a society, that activity may be chilled. The studies examined below can 
provide a basis for courts’ analysis of chilling effects in the modern Fourth Amendment 
context.  
The feasibility of pervasive data collection creates uncertainty as to whether one’s 
behavior is being observed. Significantly, “studies demonstrate that even the suggestion 
of being watched can have a strong impact on human behavior and that change in 
behavior may be involuntary and subconscious.”230 
Researchers have even found that the threat of surveillance, even if it is later 
rescinded, can “exert[] a powerful influence over behavior, beliefs, and feelings, whether 
or not that threat is realized.”231 In a 1980 experiment, students were asked to state their 
views about punishments for marijuana possession.
232
 Of students who were told a video 
recording of their statements would be given to police for training purposes, only 44% 
advocated for legalization, while 73% of students who were told that only the researchers 
would see the tape advocated for legalization.
233
 This suggests a strong chilling effect of 
government surveillance on protected speech. Meanwhile, another group was initially 
told that their views would be recorded and provided to police, but then were told the 
camera was broken, so they would not be recorded for the police.
234
  These participants 
still advocated for legalization at a lower rate and showed other indications of remaining 
influenced by the threat of surveillance.
235
 Significantly, after the experiment, 
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participants reported that they stated their views honestly.
236
 The participants did not 
believe their willingness to express their idea was affected. But it was. The effect of both 
actual and threatened surveillance was to change the honest beliefs of the participants on 
this issue. Not only the participants’ expressions, but their thoughts, were affected merely 
by the unfulfilled threat of surveillance.   
 Even where people do not believe their actions are illegal or subject to 
punishment, fear of surveillance can create a powerful chill. Social science evidence “is 
strong enough to conclude that widespread surveillance, or even the belief in it, is 
damaging to the development of diverse viewpoints, without any additional clear threat 
of injury or retaliation.”237 Even if people do not expect disfavor based on a dissenting 
viewpoint, their expression and even ideas can be chilled by surveillance.  
 More recent studies have found similar effects caused by pervasive electronic 
surveillance. The Helsinki Privacy Experiment studied the impact of ubiquitous 
surveillance over a six month period.
238
 Ten households were equipped with a myriad of 
surveillance equipment, including cameras and devices logging activity on computers and 
smartphones.
239
 Participants reported several different kinds of behavior change 
following to the surveillance, including reductions in Internet use and participation in 
civil organizations, and no longer using anonymous online forums as they would no 
longer be truly anonymous.
240
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 A 2014 study by a Master’s degree candidate at the University of Kent found that 
“online surveillance [] has behaviour changing effects that inhibit individuals from 
speaking and writing freely on the Internet.”241 The study was based on an online survey 
of 1137 German residents measuring their attitudes, behavior and knowledge with respect 
to indiscriminate online surveillance.
242
 The portion relating to chilling effects asked 
participants if they “avoided writing or speaking about particular topics [], if they had 
changed their online behaviour [] and other questions regarding violation of privacy, 
scope and approval of surveillance.”243 The study concluded that “when people worry 
about being surveilled online and are aware of being watched by intelligence agencies or 
other governmental institutions, they refrain from acting illegally. However, this 
behavioural confinement extends onto legal but controversial (i.e. not conform to the 
government’s opinion) topics and practices in order to circumvent reprisal.”244 A chilling 
effect was most strongly correlated with concern about online surveillance, and was 
significant regardless of whether the participant identified with the groups they believed 
were being surveilled.
245
  
 The study suggested that one way governments could avoid these chilling effects 
is by creating a transparent legal process that could assure citizens they were not the 
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subject of surveillance. “By making sure that espionage techniques are exclusively used 
on criminals and terrorists and that this procedure is regulated by independent public 
courts, intelligence agencies could regain the trust of citizens, thereby decreasing the 
negative psychological effects of Internet surveillance.”246 This study suggests that 
concern about surveillance leads to chilling effects, but sufficient legal protections can 
counteract this harm. 
 A 2014 article entitled “Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior” 
examined the effect of widespread knowledge of Internet search tracking by the NSA 
program PRISM on Internet searches by individuals.
247
 The study tracked the usage on 
Google’s search engine of several hundred different search terms. The data set was 
derived from “Google Trends, which is a public source of cross-national search volume 
for particular search terms.”248  These included a set of “suspicious” search terms relating 
to national security, established by a survey as “likely to get you in trouble with the US 
government,” a set of potentially embarrassing terms, established by a survey as “likely 
to get you in trouble with a friend,” and a control set of Google’s top 50 search terms.249 
The study measured the usage of these terms before and after the PRISM disclosures, 
seeking to understand how the knowledge of this type of Internet surveillance can affect 
behavior.
250
  
 The results found a significant chilling of Internet search behavior. After the 
PRISM disclosures, searches in the U.S. categorized as “likely to get you in trouble with 
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the U.S. government,” fell by about 5%, a “highly significant” statistical finding.251 
These search terms were generally not political in nature. Rather they related to 
emergency and threat terms, for example, “chemical burn,” “hazmat” or “pipe bomb.”252 
The PRISM disclosures also decreased Google users’ willingness to seek information on 
personal issues. Though the effect was not seen in the US-only data, the total data set 
including international searches also found a significant decrease in those searches 
“likely to get you in trouble with a friend.”253  
 The study demonstrates a real-world, empirical impact of pervasive surveillance. 
The individuals in this data set—that is, all Google users—have no reason to suspect they 
are a target of individualized surveillance. They have no reason to fear particularized 
attention from the government. Rather, the awareness of pervasive Internet surveillance 
has created self-censorship in this data set. Users’ expression was chilled as to 
controversial topics in both national security and personal affairs. These results 
demonstrate the profound threat to expression posed by pervasive surveillance. The study 
population was not targeted and the chill was not the result of stigmatization. Rather the 
general population was significantly less likely to explore controversial topics on the 
Internet.
254
   
 Because this study used real-world data, there is obviously no control group, 
which imposes limitations on the findings. However the authors took several measures to 
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verify the robustness of their findings and reduce the potential that other factors created 
the change in search habits. First, they used a widely varying set of search terms, making 
it unlikely that another news event would cause a large increase or decrease in searches 
across the data set.
255
 They also analyzed the data in a narrower time frame and the 
effects were still present “using only data from five weeks before and five weeks after the 
first surveillance revelations on June 6, 2013.”256 The authors also compared the results 
to data from 2012 and concluded seasonality was not a major factor.
257
 
 Other surveys have found similar results among specific populations. In 2013, 
writers’ organization PEN American Center surveyed its world-wide members.258 It 
found over the past two years, 24% “avoided writing or speaking about a particular topic” 
and 25% “Deliberately steered clear of certain topics in personal phone conversations or 
email messages” because they were concerned their communications were being 
monitored.
259
 Polls in the United States,
260
 Germany
261
 and Norway
262
 found some 
residents reported changing their online behavior due to surveillance concerns after the 
first Snowden revelations. 
No matter how well intentioned surveillance efforts are or how effectively 
retribution is limited only to those engaging in illegal actions, the threat of pervasive 
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surveillance has a chilling effect on lawful, constitutionally protected actions and 
expression. Social science research demonstrates that pervasive surveillance 
fundamentally causes harms that must be considered in any discussion of its efficacy.   
 
iii. Technology and Modern Surveillance 
The changes in technology over the past several decades have created 
fundamental changes in what surveillance is capable of capturing. Rapid shifts in 
communication and personal habits have made more pervasive surveillance possible. 
Changes in government technology have reduced barriers to mass collection. The effects 
of surveillance explored above, combined with the technological changes explored 
below, mean that these changes could have profound implications for the relationship 
between citizens and government.  
If the Fourth Amendment is to continue to protect privacy and to safeguard 
expression, the law must adapt to these changes. Technological development has created 
significant challenges for Fourth Amendment law. First, the impact of these changes 
underscores the need for technology-centered approach. As technology changes more 
quickly and, in turn, alters people’s basic habits more quickly, the Fourth Amendment 
cannot evaluate expectations of privacy based on technical details. Second, technology 
has transformed the capabilities of surveillance so as to threaten free expression in ways 
previously unimaginable. The scope of surveillance and the elimination of barriers to 
pervasive data collection mean that expression is implicated in Fourth Amendment cases 
as never before.  
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1. New Technologies Are Being Adopted More Rapidly 
Than In the Past 
 
The relationship between people and personal technology has changed. In turn, 
this has altered the relationship between the First and Fourth Amendments. As Chief 
Justice Roberts notes in the introductory quotation, Fourth Amendment standards are 
designed in light of the technology of the time. For much of American history, violating 
someone’s privacy required a trespass onto their land or property. Thus Fourth 
Amendment theory could make use of this physical demarcation.
263
 And only long after 
this premise—that a physical trespass was the only meaningful invasion of privacy—
became anachronistic did the court alter its approach in Katz.
264
 Adjusting to the current 
technological era presents a formidable judicial challenge. Technology and, perhaps more 
significantly, mainstream adoption of new technologies are now changing more quickly 
than ever before.
265
 Standards based on the details of a technology can become obsolete 
as quickly as they are developed. This trend means that courts need a technology-
centered approach that can apply to emerging technologies. 
The smartphone is a prime example of the speed of modern technological 
advance. The mobile, Internet-equipped smartphone is perhaps the single most quickly-
adopted technology in history.  Smartphones “have also outpaced nearly any comparable 
technology in the leap to mainstream use.”266 For example,  “[i]t took landline telephones 
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about 45 years to get from 5 percent to 50 percent penetration among U.S. households, 
and mobile phones took around seven years to reach a similar proportion of 
consumers.”267 Below is a chart demonstrating the amount of time required for various 
technologies to go from peripheral use (>10%) to mainstream use (<40%). In addition to 
smartphones, mobile phones and Internet access rank among the technologies most 
quickly adopted into mainstream use.  
 
Figure B 
Rate of Technology Adoption 
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As of 2014, 58% of American adults owned smartphones.
269
 Though smartphones 
are only one of many technological changes that significantly affect people’s everyday 
lives, they illustrate both the pace and impact of this evolution.
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Smartphones demonstrate how new technologies can change the capabilities of 
electronic surveillance. These devices have changed the dynamics of how people 
communicate, which can be seen most starkly in trends among young people. Between 
2009 and 2011, coinciding with the rise of the smartphone, the number of U.S. teens who 
talked on the phone with friends daily dropped from 38% to 26% and the number who 
talked in person outside of school dropped from 33% to 25%.
271
 Meanwhile, by 2011, 
63% of teens exchanged text messages with friends daily and 29%, more than the number 
who exchanged phone calls or talked in person, exchanged messages on social media.
272
  
These changes are one of many examples of Americans’ rapidly changing 
personal habits. Recently-developed technologies now facilitate a great deal of peoples’ 
communication. However, they can also facilitate surveillance of these communications. 
The potential of these changes to chill expression, particularly given that the pace of 
changes makes it difficult for courts or legislatures to keep up, will be explored further 
below. But additionally, such changes raise problems for those who distinguish between 
forms of communication based on technical details. If communication via social media is 
replacing communication via a voice call, do reasonable expectations justify treating 
these communications differently under the Fourth Amendment? 
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2. More of People’s Lives Are Mediated Through 
Technology 
 
As explored above, the way people communicate, and the mediums through 
which they communicate, are changing more quickly than ever before. Because of current 
Fourth Amendment law, these changes in habits have potentially profound legal 
consequences. For instance, while surveillance of telephone communication require a 
warrant, emails, social media messaging and other electronic forms of communication 
lack definitive constitutional protection from warrantless collection.
273
 The proliferation 
of methods of communication for which legal protections are reduced or unsettled 
exposes a greater amount of communication to potential warrantless collection. 
Other actions may be mediated and recorded in less obvious ways. Smartphones 
contain GPS systems and surveillance methods can track the location of a phone even 
when it is turned off.
274
 The government’s authority to collect GPS location data without 
a warrant remains a disputed legal question,
275
 but traditional third party doctrine 
principles would allow for this collection. In any case, smartphones have rapidly made 
this sensitive, but not necessarily private information—a person’s location—available to 
those with access to the phone’s data as never before.  
Lastly, smartphones have encouraged the mediation of people’s private notes and 
thoughts. Smartphones have become incredibly personal, storing varied types of personal 
information and with a person nearly every waking minute. The Supreme Court has noted 
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this fact, stating “nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet 
of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in 
the shower.”276 Smartphone users record personal notes, grocery lists and calendars, and 
this information is often backed up remotely to a cloud storage device. Smartphone apps 
offer to record everything from sleep patterns
277
 to health indictors
278
 to menstruation 
cycles.
279
 And while information stored on a hard drive would require a warrant while 
information stored on a cloud is shared with a third party, “cell phone users often may not 
know whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud.”280 As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Riley, these apps “can form a revealing montage of the 
user's life.”281 Smartphones offer many advantages, but they can also create data about 
very personal matters that did not previously exist in any tangible form.  
The example of the smartphone illustrates the ways in which changes in consumer 
technology can change people’s everyday habits and how recent advances have done so 
more quickly than in the past. Conversations that were once ephemeral are now 
preserved, often on a private company’s servers. Movements in public that were once 
merely observable are now recordable. And personal notes or calendars once scribbled on 
scraps of paper can now be saved to the cloud. In Riley, the Court stated, “Indeed, a cell 
phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
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exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive 
records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private 
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”282 Not only is 
more revealing personal data created, but the way in which it is stored, though it may be 
irrelevant or even unknown to the user, could make it accessible without a warrant. 
The adoption of the technologies that facilitate these basic changes in our 
information ecosystem has been unprecedented in its speed and breadth.
283
 And when 
these technological changes have the legal impact of making citizens’ lives more easily 
observed by government, the changes can have vast social consequences.
284
 As 
communication, behavior, and even thoughts are recorded and accessible as never before, 
the threat of chilling people’s expressive activities has never been greater. In this way, 
technology has made First Amendment rights more dependent on Fourth Amendment 
protections than ever before. The mediation of all these types of data creates the potential 
for surveillance of a much greater fraction of people’s lives. 
 
3. These Changes Create the Potential for Long-Term, 
Retroactive Surveillance 
 
Another fundamental change brought by these shifts in technology is the 
drastically increased capability for retroactive collection. An important distinction in 
surveillance is between proactive surveillance, in which the government begins collecting 
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information by observing a target or collecting contemporaneous information, and 
retroactive surveillance, in which the government collects information documenting the 
past.  
Police have always been able to acquire intimate information about a person 
through proactive surveillance. Methods such as observation in plain view, use of 
undercover informants or keeping tabs on movements could reveal a great deal about a 
target. Although technological changes make this type of surveillance easier, it has 
always been feasible. But technological changes have altered the potential for retroactive 
surveillance entirely. Modern Americans, through interaction with a variety of electronic 
mediums, create vastly more data about themselves than ever before. For instance, 
license plate reader systems (LPR) can be mounted on police cars or fixed sites to scan 
and archive data on any car that passes.
285
 Law enforcement agencies and government 
contractors have been building a massive catalogue of LPR scans with billions of data 
points.
286
 This type of passive, suspicionless data collection creates the potential for far 
more revealing retroactive surveillance than has ever previously been possible. 
As explored above, communication and many other types of personal data are 
now created through the use of modern technology. For instance, location has always 
been an observable phenomenon, but it has never before been generated automatically—
remotely observable, recordable, and capable of after-the-fact data collection. Similarly, a 
text message creates a record of information that a phone call does not. An Internet 
search leaves a record, whereas opening an encyclopedia or some other resource does 
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not. These are not new types of information, but technology has changed the principles of 
how this information can be obtained and has created the potential for previously 
impracticable long-term, retroactive collection.  
Moreover, this retroactive surveillance can occur in secret. This can include 
collection of broad swaths of data, from communications to location to personal notes, 
through a third party often with no notice to the surveillance target. 
The passive creation of data documenting myriad aspects of individuals’ lives 
raised the potential of highly intrusive retroactive surveillance. Courts have begun to 
recognize that searches of huge databases can be incredibly revealing and therefore the 
rules governing these searches must evolve in order to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment.
287
 Some types of information, such as location, could previously be 
collected only prospectively or simultaneously. Some types, such as recorded 
communications, could sometimes have been obtained retroactively, but as a rule, fewer 
historical records existed. Moreover, they were less likely to be centrally stored by a third 
party, making collection much more difficult. Indiscriminate, suspicionless data 
collection enables warrantless retroactive surveillance that was not possible on a similar 
scale in the past. 
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4. Electronic Surveillance Eliminates Traditional 
Limitations on Surveillance 
 
The final major change imposed by technology is the elimination of the practical 
barriers that constrained state surveillance in the past. As Justice Alito stated in Jones, “In 
the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor 
statutory, but practical.”288 When longer or more scrutinizing surveillance required 
additional man-power, hard choices had to be made about resource allocation and 
cost/benefit balancing. When a police department dispatched an officer to perform 
physical surveillance or gather documents, it took that officer away from some other task. 
This meant physical surveillance had to be rationed and applied judiciously.  
Many forms of modern electronic surveillance drastically reduce the marginal 
costs of collecting information on citizens. As explored in Jones, moving from physical 
location surveillance to remote GPS tracking makes “long-term monitoring relatively 
easy and cheap.”289 Similarly, collection of telephone metadata, which used to require a 
pen register for each target, can now be collected, aggregated and analyzed in mass.
290
 
For methods such as these, collection of each additional individual’s information requires 
only negligibly more resources. These and other changes in technology have changed the 
fundamental calculations affecting surveillance. Rather than making hard choices about 
how to use surveillance resources, the government at every level can choose to follow the 
mantra of the National Security Agency: “Collect it all.”291 
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The rise of technology enabling covert, retroactive electronic surveillance means 
that Fourth Amendment law must regulate methods of intrusion far more potent than 
originally conceived. At the time of the drafting of the constitution, a search of letters 
could reveal some of one’s communications; a search of notes could reveal some of one’s 
thoughts; and perhaps even a “tiny constable”292 could observe one’s actions in public. 
But there was no possibility that all of these could happen on an ongoing basis, without 
the knowledge of the observed. For the most part, these types of searches were a discrete 
event, which was understood by all involved. But now, Justice Brandeis’ fear that 
“[w]ays may someday be developed by which the government, without removing papers 
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,” has been realized.293  
When enhanced electronic surveillance is “cheap in comparison to conventional 
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and 
community hostility.’”294 The idea that one’s conversations, thoughts and movements 
could be secretly recorded, potentially without a warrant, threatens the idea that privacy 
can serve as a protector of free expression.  
 
c. Summary 
These technological shifts lead to two conclusions. First, technology neutrality is 
a necessity in order to develop a consistent legal approach that minimizes chilling effects 
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on free expression. The development of Fourth Amendment law demonstrates repeatedly 
that technology-specific simply cannot standards to keep pace. For decades, Fourth 
Amendment law granted the government carte blanche to perform perhaps the 
quintessential modern invasion of privacy: the warrantless wiretap. What is now regarded 
as a profound invasion of privacy was legal from the invention of the telephone in the 
1870s, to its development into mainstream use in the 1920s and 30s, until the Katz 
decision in 1967. New technology is now being adopted into the mainstream at a rapid 
and accelerating pace, making the only path to protect these interests a technology-
neutral Fourth Amendment standard.  
Second, electronic surveillance now threatens to chill more types of expression in 
ways more pervasive than ever before. An individual’s interaction with technology 
creates records of previously ephemeral words and actions. Such records can often be 
acquired retroactively, from third parties and without notice to the target. And many of 
the practical limitations to mass surveillance have been eroded or eliminated. These 
changes in technology demonstrate that more and more of people’s lives are exposed to 
potential surveillance. This means that the chilling effects scholars have begun to identify 
as a consequence of indiscriminate surveillance now threaten to affect more actions, 
expression and ideas than ever before. The Fourth Amendment can and must protect First 
Amendment interests, or privacy, free expression and free thought will be imperiled.  
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IV. THE PATH FORWARD: A TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH 
The previous sections have explored the failings of current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and the alarming consequences of these failings. This analysis will add to the 
growing chorus of dissent regarding search and seizure law and better define precisely 
how pervasive surveillance creates serious harms. Courts must have a standard by which 
to judge the novel Fourth Amendment issues that come with modern law enforcement 
techniques. The heavy lifting of reforming the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will lie 
in designing a workable standard to replace it. This section will examine a few ground-
breaking proposals that not only critique but offer creative solutions to modern Fourth 
Amendment problems. It will then expand on these proposals to present an improved 
framework for Fourth Amendment reform.  
 
a. Mosaic Theory 
Mosaic Theory is the recent Fourth Amendment reform proposal that has gained 
the most traction with scholars and courts.
295
 The premise is that information collected 
through means not considered a Fourth Amendment “search” may be transformed into 
one when large data sets are aggregated to create a revealing “mosaic” of a person’s 
life.
296
 As discussed above, this theory attempts to counteract the problematic 
implications of the increasing capacity to both collect and integrate information about an 
individual by setting a threshold limitation on the amount of information that may be 
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collected without a warrant.
297
 If law enforcement exceeds this limitation, Fourth 
Amendment protections kick in and further collection would require a warrant or warrant 
exception.
298
 This theory counters the idea under a theory such as the third party doctrine 
that a collection method either is or is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the amount of information collected.  
Mosaic Theory is a foundational model in the legal response to modern 
surveillance. Under the frame of Mosaic Theory, an increasing number of courts and 
scholars have recognized that “prolonged surveillance of a person's movements may 
reveal an intimate picture of his life,”299 and this recognition is an incredibly important 
step forward. Changes in technology and habits have changed how the Fourth 
Amendment protects communication, and Mosaic Theory provides a powerful 
description of this change. 
Although Mosaic Theory has been influential in adapting Fourth Amendment 
theory to the changes in surveillance and data aggregation, it also has important 
shortcomings. Its adoption represents a very significant change in approach for courts. 
The first and perhaps most obvious question is: how much is too much? How will law 
enforcement lawfully collecting information without a warrant know when they have 
collected so much data that the collection now constitutes a search? Courts and scholars 
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have varied significantly on this question.
300
 This is an exceedingly difficult question to 
answer and will likely require arbitrary line drawing.
301
 
Another question is how to understand what information can be combined as part 
of the same “search.” If the information is collected through different methods, should it 
all be considered part of the same data set when determining whether the mosaic is 
sufficiently revealing?
302
 Does it matter if no one individual has access to the entire data 
set? What about one unit or one department? 
Of course any proposal to fundamentally change an area of the law will have 
unanswered questions. But Mosaic Theory is particularly problematic because it proposes 
such a fact specific analysis for determining whether a search has occurred. In other 
words, the necessity of getting a warrant to continue collecting information will 
necessarily vary in each case because the mosaic of evidence will be different in each 
case. This presents important problems for both law enforcement and citizens. Because 
the mosaic of evidence will be different from case to case, both in the information 
collected and the methods used to collect it, law enforcement will struggle to predict the 
Fourth Amendment threshold in each case. This lack of clarity for law enforcement can 
impose practical confusion and create a greater chance of disrupting prosecutions due to 
the exclusionary rule.
303
 
Second, Mosaic Theory ultimately fails to provide citizens with an assurance of 
privacy in any of their actions or communications. As discussed above, the fear of 
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surveillance can have a powerful chill on speech and even thoughts.
304
 Mosaic Theory 
essentially leaves in place the third party doctrine for sporadic or short term surveillance. 
Although this may reduce the likelihood of a sensitive email or Internet search being 
surveilled, it remains as a legal possibility. This would continue to compromise privacy 
and impose harmful chilling effects. Mosaic Theory would prevent law enforcement from 
collecting a large aggregation of data on an individual. But citizens still have no 
assurance that their sensitive information will not be collected.  
While Mosaic Theory has great descriptive power, it produces more questions 
than answers. Raising these questions is a building block of Fourth Amendment reform. 
But as a solution to Fourth Amendment problems, Mosaic Theory is unsatisfactory. It 
creates uncertainty for law enforcement without ensuring key protections to citizens. 
 
b. The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure305 
Daniel Solove’s The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure306 suggests a novel 
approach, seeking to expand warrant protections based on the First Amendment value of 
the targeted information, rather than under the Fourth Amendment. Solove quite 
persuasively argues for the important role of the First Amendment in protecting interests 
in privacy, anonymity, dissent and autonomy. Solove states, “A century ago, the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments would have significantly restricted government information 
gathering that involves what I will refer to as ‘First Amendment activities’—speech, 
association, consumption of ideas, political activity, religion, and journalism. But today, 
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the Fourth and Fifth Amendments play a much diminished role in these contexts.”307 
Rather than attempt to preserve the Fourth Amendment’s role in protecting First 
Amendment interests, Solove argues that the First Amendment should have an 
independent role in protecting against search and seizure.  
The basic proposal is this: surveillance requires judicial approval if “the 
government information gathering affect[s] activities that fall within the boundaries of 
the First Amendment” and “it [has] a chilling effect upon such activities.”308 This change 
would be monumental; it would require a warrant for any government collection of 
expressive material if it chilled such expression. This approach does not easily integrate 
into how First Amendment speech is often protected. Generally, Fourth Amendment 
protections apply regardless of content. As Solove observed, in many cases “A diary and 
a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.”309 However, where speech 
constitutes a part of a crime, or is alleged to, it is likely without First Amendment 
protection. And Solove acknowledges this as one of the limiting principles of this 
proposal’s protections.310 Where the government would attempt to collect speech based 
on its criminal content, it would be outside the First Amendment’s protection. If law 
enforcement’s ability, under the First Amendment, to access the speech depends on 
whether the contents constitute part of a crime, the logic becomes circular. 
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Solove’s proposals are more of a revolution than a reform in search and seizure 
law. Beyond creating new, independent grounds for challenging surveillance, they would 
serve to reverse long-established precedent on a variety of issues. The holdings of 
virtually all of the third party doctrine cases would be reversed, with phone records, 
business records and financial records likely requiring a warrant.
311
 Even beyond this, 
law enforcement would be required to obtain a warrant to force people to testify about 
another person’s First Amendment activities.312 Seemingly, even statements police 
overheard while passing on a street corner would be subject to potential suppression as 
warrantless surveillance. The scope of reform is both refreshingly bold and dangerously 
sweeping. Although Solove intends to better protect First Amendment interests against 
modern intrusions, the article does not adequately address the practical challenges of 
imposing criminal procedure on law enforcement activities. 
Solving the diminution of Fourth Amendment protections by creating an 
independent role for the First Amendment is a stark shift in doctrine. But it is also 
unlikely to adequately protect these rights. As discussed above, forcing defendants to 
argue for suppression of evidence collected in accordance with the Fourth Amendment 
based on independent First Amendment grounds will put those defendants in a very 
disadvantageous position in the average criminal case.
313
  
Although Solove’s article may struggle to make the ambitious argument that 
virtually any First Amendment chilling effect should create a constitutional criminal 
procedure right, it accomplishes the still-significant task of outlining how the diminished 
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protections of the Fourth Amendment create chilling effects.
314
 These chilling effects, as 
a kind of by-product of the divergence of Fourth Amendment protections from First 
Amendment-protected information, must play an important role in solving the problems 
created by this divergence. While much of the discussion of chilling effects focuses on 
political repercussions or stigmatic harms,
315
 Solove’s article does recognize that “broad 
information gathering that is not directly tied to a concrete penalty or consequence…may 
still chill speech.”316 Solove insists that chilling effects play a direct role in informing 
what the Fourth Amendment protects.  
 
c. The Technology-Centered Approach 
David Gray and Danielle Citron’s article The Right to Quantitative Privacy seeks 
to address some of the weaknesses of Mosaic Theory while providing working approach 
for reigning in mass surveillance.
317
 The result is a powerful and important proposal for 
revisions to search and seizure law. Gray and Citron’s article focuses on the role of the 
Fourth Amendment as a “constitutional bulwark against law enforcement’s tendency to 
engage in broader and ever more intrusive surveillance.”318 This idea recognizes that the 
Fourth Amendment is the source both of criminal procedure rights for individual 
defendants, and the relationship between citizens and the state. It therefore emphasizes 
the importance of preserving the Fourth Amendment as a societal safeguard against 
surveillance when determining when a search has occurred. 
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The proposal is for a “technology-centered” approach to determining whether the 
Fourth Amendment protects against a collection method. It focuses on the surveillance 
potential of the collection technology at issue. The article states, 
“The threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether a 
technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate 
surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative 
privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use 
of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement 
officers or other government agents. If it does not, then the Fourth 
Amendment imposes no limitations on law enforcement's use of that 
technology, regardless of how much information officers gather against a 
particular target in a particular case. By contrast, if it does threaten 
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, then the government’s use 
of that technology amounts to a ‘search,’ and must be subjected to the 
crucible of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including judicially 
enforced constraints on law enforcement’s discretion.”319 
 
In determining if the Fourth Amendment should apply to a collection technology, 
courts should consider “(1) the inherent scope of a technology’s surveillance capabilities, 
be they narrow or broad; (2) the technology’s scale and scalability; and (3) the costs 
associated with deploying and using the technology.”320 If the answers to these questions 
indicate the technology can facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance, “granting law 
enforcement unfettered access to that technology would violate reasonable expectations 
of quantitative privacy,” and such surveillance should be considered a Fourth 
Amendment search.
321
 This proposal wrestles directly with the most disruptive change to 
government investigative capacity: the development of technologies capable of cheap, 
indiscriminate surveillance. It makes powerful arguments that this change in approach is 
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both warranted by modern technology and ideologically consistent with the foundations 
of Fourth Amendment law.
322
 
As an example, the article applies the method to drone-enabled video 
surveillance. This method is “highly scalable and increasingly inexpensive, promising an 
ever-expanding fleet of drones creating an ever-broadening surveillance net in the skies 
above us.”323 A drone system is capable of broad, indiscriminate and covert 
surveillance.
324
 Even where surveillance is not occurring, “the ambient threat of 
unlimited surveillance by drones would remain ubiquitous and constant.”325 Thus, 
generally speaking, such surveillance would implicate the Fourth Amendment.
326
 This 
would not prevent law enforcement drone use, but rather would require a warrant or 
warrant exception.
327
  
 
d. A Proposal 
The third party doctrine has taken a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
that is akin to a dictator grudgingly accepted by world governments. Nations recognize 
that a despot’s decisions can be arbitrary and at times oppressive, but this is accepted in 
the name of maintaining order. Each of the proposals discussed above has flaws. But the 
technology-centered approach provides a workable path forward that protects individual 
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rights and preserves the Fourth Amendment as a pillar of constitutional protection against 
government overreach. 
This thesis proposes to adopt a technology-centered approach that focuses on the 
potential for a technology to facilitate pervasive, indiscriminate surveillance. Using this 
approach as the bedrock of Fourth Amendment reform has many strengths. Importantly, 
it meets the problem imposed by modern surveillance head on. This standard targets a 
particular threat that current Fourth Amendment law is not adequate to handle: pervasive 
surveillance. Technologies with the potential for indiscriminate surveillance have 
changed what information citizens can keep private from the state. This change in 
constitutional protection can create chilling effects on speech, association and ideas. The 
solution should match these problems. Both in a broad and narrow sense, the technology-
centered approach accomplishes this. Broadly, the approach focuses directly on the 
changes in technology that have rendered older Fourth Amendment tests insufficient. 
And more narrowly, the approach provides the principles to parse which new 
technological methods pose novel problems and which do not.  
Technology has changed so that pervasive and indiscriminate surveillance that 
was previously unthinkable is now quite feasible. The utilization of such surveillance has 
demonstrable and highly problematic consequences, such as the chilling of expression, 
and even ideas. Current doctrine fails as applied to these technologies. Therefore, this is 
what reform should focus on.  
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i. Balancing Law Enforcement Needs with Changing Technologies 
 
The technology-centered approach is a technology-neutral path forward for 
Fourth Amendment law to adapt to technological change while preserving law 
enforcement capabilities. As discussed above, technology neutrality is the idea that the 
Fourth Amendment exists not to prevent some particular form of invasion, but to 
guarantee the substantive right from unreasonable search and seizure.
328
 This approach 
recognizes that although the methods available to law enforcement must change with 
technology, the allowable incursions into citizen’s privacy should stay essentially the 
same. In other words, “the Fourth Amendment [should] permit access to that which 
technology hides,” but also “should protect that which technology exposes.”329 The 
technology-centered approach accomplishes this by focusing reform on the modern 
collection methods capable of exposing previously private or practically obscure 
information on a mass scale, while preserving human investigation methods that do not 
pose a similar threat. 
 Additionally, this approach is far more easily adaptable to changing technology 
while preserving law enforcement capabilities. For example, Mosaic Theory could 
invalidate investigation tactics long thought to be constitutional. In Maynard, the D.C. 
Circuit held that although the suspect’s location could have been observed by a police 
officer without a warrant, electronic surveillance of his location for several weeks 
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violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
330
 Theoretically, the suspect could have 
been tailed by police officers in shifts for several weeks. Though it would require a great 
many more resources than electronic surveillance, it could be done. Police have used 
such tactics for decades. The problem, then, is saying that merely because the car was 
continuously observed without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment was violated. This 
same logic would cut off a traditional police stakeout after a certain amount of time. This 
is problematic because it makes unconstitutional a traditionally-used method that does 
not pose any new or novel issue. It makes little sense to argue that physical surveillance 
that has always been permissible is now unconstitutional, merely because a different way 
of accomplishing this task enables indiscriminate surveillance. 
A strength of the technology-centered approach is that it avoids this incongruity 
by leaving much of Fourth Amendment law intact. It preserves the central holding of 
Katz. Unlike the Mosaic Theory, it preserves a sequential approach to Fourth Amendment 
analysis, taking each government action in isolation and asking if at any point law 
enforcement made use of a means of collection considered a Fourth Amendment 
search.
331
 And more practically, because they would not pose a threat of indiscriminate 
surveillance, many traditional investigative methods would still be available to law 
enforcement without obtaining a warrant. A technology-centered approach provides an 
ideologically consistent way of addressing new problems without disturbing many 
traditional practices and methods.  
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Consequently, it avoids many of the difficult and perhaps unanswerable questions 
raised by applying Mosaic Theory. Because Mosaic Theory constrains activity at the 
point of aggregation rather than collection, it can be difficult to determine what 
information constitutes part of one data set. If the FBI has a cache of information on an 
individual, does all of this information make up the mosaic, even if the portions of the 
information are controlled only by separate units and have never been shared? This 
question need not be answered under a technology-centered approach because it 
maintains a sequential analysis. Just as in traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, if each 
step of collection is legitimate, there is no threat that the whole of a dataset could 
constitute a violation.  
In sum, this “approach would not implicate human surveillance and other 
traditional investigative techniques.”332 Because human investigation methods do not 
implicate the danger of indiscriminate, pervasive surveillance and the harms associated 
with this, it would not be limited by a technology-centered approach and would continue 
to be governed by current doctrine. One could argue that this focus on technology ignores 
the potential for a surveillance state powered by human surveillance. As Nazi Germany 
or many Soviet satellite states demonstrate, the power of invasive, human surveillance 
can create a powerful chill. But for a variety of reasons, this distinction between human 
and technological surveillance is significant.
333
 Even where it is possible to collect the 
same information, human methods simply cannot rival electronic collection’s capacity for 
indiscriminate surveillance.   
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Additionally, physical surveillance methods provide for greater transparency and 
political checks. Human observation necessarily requires more overt methods of 
collection. Where human surveillance increases to the scope that it threatens to create a 
surveillance state, the necessary resources and physical presence will force a level of 
public awareness of its presence that may not occur in the case of cheaper, more discreet 
electronic surveillance.
334
 This provides a greater opportunity for a political response to 
surveillance.  
 The technology-centered approach better balances the competing interests at the 
core of the Fourth Amendment. It preserves many traditional methods for which a 
warrant requirement would significantly restrain the practice of police work. But it 
recognizes the profound changes in surveillance capacity and responds head on to the 
societal challenges this creates. 
  
ii. Clarifying “Broad” Surveillance 
There are important ways in which the technology-centered approach proposed by 
Gray and Citron in The Right to Quantitative Privacy can be strengthened. Criteria must 
be provided for distinguishing broad from narrow surveillance. The article provides three 
main criteria for determining when a technology is capable of scaling to support 
indiscriminate surveillance: “(1) the inherent scope of a technology’s surveillance 
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capabilities, be they narrow or broad; (2) the technology’s scale and scalability; and (3) 
the costs associated with deploying and using the technology.”335 Gray and Citron 
provide little clarity on how courts are to distinguish “broad” from “narrow” surveillance.  
Chilling effects should be considered in this analysis. Chilling effects provide one 
of the enduring fears about government surveillance and an important way to identify its 
most pernicious dangers. When a surveillance technology has the potential to create 
chilling effects, it should be considered “broad” surveillance for at least two reasons. 
First, such surveillance implicates a wide set of rights implicating not only privacy rights, 
but also rights of autonomy, free expression and free thought. Second, chilling effects 
pose a societal harm that can affect even those who are never actually subject to 
surveillance. Defining how “broad” surveillance is, based only on who is actually 
surveilled, would ignore an important impact of surveillance: chilling effects on those 
who fear such surveillance. Chilling effects provide a way to measure the true breadth of 
the impact of a surveillance technology. 
For instance, gunshot locators are a common feature of urban police departments. 
These systems are often installed in high crime areas.
336
 If the system were cheaply 
scalable to a mass application, would such a system be broad enough to intrude on 
peoples’ quantitative expectations of privacy? The question likely depends on whether 
this is considered broad or narrow surveillance. It certainly seems less intrusive than 
other forms of indiscriminate surveillance. But without criteria it may be difficult to 
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explain why. One significant reason is that these systems are narrowly tailored to avoid 
chilling lawful behavior. A dense system of microphones that picks up and records all 
sounds would implicate very different rights than a dense system that merely alerts 
authorities to the noise of a gunshot. An important way to distinguish these systems is to 
identify the extent to which they chill the exercise of other rights. 
   The technology-centered approach also allows for creative legislative 
solutions to balancing Fourth Amendment rights with law enforcement 
capabilities. Where legislation acts to blunt some aspects of the technology that 
made it a threat to reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, different 
constitutional analysis can apply. If a technology is capable of broad 
indiscriminate surveillance, but the possibility has been made legally 
impermissible by legislation, the evaluation changes. Courts should judge the 
legally permissible applications of the technology.  In this way, the government 
can take advantage of improving technologies to benefit investigations while 
limiting the breadth of surveillance to avoid Fourth Amendment challenges. A 
constitutional problem can be avoided and policies can be clarified if the threat of 
surveillance is reined in by comprehensive legislation. 
 
iii. Challenges to the Technology-Centered Approach 
 
A primary objection to the technology-centered approach will undoubtedly 
be that it does not provide sufficiently clear guidelines for law enforcement. The 
exclusionary rule means that if police invade a suspect’s reasonable expectations 
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of privacy to obtain evidence without a warrant or applicable warrant exception, 
the evidence generally will be suppressed. If police are unsure how to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment, it can be harmful for all parties. Suspects may have 
their Fourth Amendment rights violated (suppression of the resulting evidence 
only partially ameliorates this harm), and police waste resources collecting 
inadmissible evidence. If each new technology requires a judge’s evaluation, law 
enforcement frequently will be either violating the Fourth Amendment or denying 
themselves allowable investigation techniques out of fear that they may violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  
However, lawmakers can soften the harsh effects of the exclusionary rule 
by enacting legislation that delineates search rules for law enforcement, allowing 
evidence obtained in good faith to be presented in court. For example, in 
Warshak, the search of email was found to violate the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but the evidence was not subject to the exclusionary rule 
because police relied on a good faith interpretation of a federal law.
337
 This 
approach would allow police to use methods they believe to be constitutional 
without as great a risk of having evidence suppressed, and will allow courts to 
build precedent without such harsh implications for individual cases. 
Critics will no doubt argue that the technology-centered approach changes the 
focus of Fourth Amendment analysis from intrusion on an the privacy of a particular 
individual to an evaluation of the broader threat to society as a whole. The argument 
would point out that an individual who was tracked remotely by a highly sophisticated, 
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expensive GPS tracking system may potentially have no recourse, while an individual 
who was tracked by a cheaper system capable of mass surveillance has had their Fourth 
Amendment rights violated. This could make an individual’s rights dependent on the 
development of technology that is beyond his or her control and essentially irrelevant to 
her personal actions. But this “problem” merely reflects the way in which Fourth 
Amendment analysis has always operated. Under traditional doctrine, law enforcement 
can often collect information by one means but not another. Police can search a person’s 
home when she is not there with the consent of her housemate, but cannot if the target is 
home and objects.
338
 In determining whether a limited search is permissible, police can 
consider many factors extraneous to a target’s actions, such as presence in a high crime 
area.
339
 Police can invade people’s reasonable expectations of privacy based on a warrant 
exception such as exigency, even if not necessarily created by the target.
340
 Fourth 
Amendment doctrine has always melded individual and societal concerns in determining 
the proper lines for warrantless searches.  
 Another similar argument is that discarding the third party doctrine leaves an 
individual’s privacy to the whim of the companies that hold that individual’s information. 
If, for instance, a search of emails required a warrant, an email provider could voluntarily 
choose to reveal those emails to the government without a warrant. At least as a 
constitutional matter, this is likely both true and unremarkable. Similarly, for anyone who 
shares a home with another person, that other individual could consent to a warrantless 
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search of the home, so long as the other individual was not present to object.
341
 Exclusive 
control has never been a requirement for a physical space to be considered private under 
the Fourth Amendment, and this should not change merely because the search is of an 
electronic “space.”  
 
e. Summary 
The Fourth Amendment does not create a general right to privacy.
342
 But it does 
prohibit “every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual.”343 The Supreme Court made clear in Katz that an intrusion is not justified 
merely because it does not cross an arbitrary technological line. In order to protect 
against the type of indiscriminate government searches that the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to prevent, courts must recognize a more adaptable understanding of privacy. 
The technology-centered approach provides a set of technology-neutral principles for 
courts to weigh when a search has occurred. 
One compelling strength of this proposal is that it is unlikely to satisfy either 
privacy advocates or law enforcement officials. The standard is decidedly more 
protective of privacy than the third party doctrine. But under it, many highly revealing 
traditional methods will not be considered a search. And unlike Mosaic Theory, there is 
no substantive line the government cannot cross. Lawfully collected information may be 
integrated and analyzed to reveal a detailed picture of an individual’s life. This approach 
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preserves the Fourth Amendment as a shield against pervasive government surveillance 
while empowering law enforcement to utilize every tool at their discretion. 
Although it is important to give law enforcement adequate resources to pursue 
their mission, the Fourth Amendment is an intentional restriction on this power in the 
service of broader democratic values. Law enforcement’s mission and values will always 
push for greater ability to investigate crimes, not out of desire to create a police state but 
because this is the inevitable result of dogged police work. As Justice Brandeis observed, 
“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning, but without understanding.”344 The Fourth Amendment is meant to limit the 
government’s power to search and seize, even when this limitation will interfere with 
investigatory tools. The drafters of the Constitution targeted indiscriminate searches and 
general warrants precisely because of their power—to reveal and to oppress. To the 
extent that the technology-centered approach protects against the type of pervasive state 
intrusion that has been feared since the Constitution’s inception, this restriction on the 
power of law enforcement is intentional and monumentally important. 
The technology-centered approach navigates the changes to surveillance 
capabilities to protect both privacy and expressive rights. The Bill of Rights creates a 
bulwark between government and the people and preserving dissent and disfavored 
expression is a central reason for this. Under this approach, courts can weigh the impact 
on these rights in evaluating surveillance technologies and thus better preserve this 
bulwark. 
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The technology-centered approach undoubtedly has doctrinal challenges. But 
critics who would raise concerns about clarity for law enforcement must confront the 
reality of the modern third party doctrine, which cannot deliver the clarity its proponents 
claim it can.
345
 A bright-line standard which courts refuse to apply because it diverges so 
greatly from common sense does not provide predictability. Leaving courts to follow or 
reject the third party doctrine on an ad hoc basis, with little theory guiding their decisions 
when they do, threatens citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections without providing 
consistency. Any test of reasonableness leaves ambiguity, but the American legal system 
relies on such tests, from tort law to criminal law. The technology-centered approach 
gives courts the foundation to analyze novel Fourth Amendment questions in a way that 
better preserves the balance between privacy and expression rights and law enforcement 
prerogatives.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right of privacy is not a right to be free from a list of particular intrusions. But 
privacy means more than the absence of a wiretap or physical intrusion. It is a right to 
exclude the state from our lives unless the state can justify the intrusion.  Fundamentally, 
we cannot define this right without reference to the past. A reasonable expectation of 
privacy is that recognized by a reasonable citizen. People’s expectations are informed by 
the rights that they have enjoyed up to that point. Roughly speaking, people expect that 
they will continue to enjoy the same rights they have always had, unless there is a good 
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reason for a change. Simply put, the fact that the government has the technical capability 
for greater surveillance over its citizens is not a good reason.  
 Restricting technological surveillance is not about Luddism or artificially 
hamstringing law enforcement. It is simply another step in the development of a Fourth 
Amendment law that reflects the problems of the society it protects. As practical 
limitations on surveillance disappear, the law must play a different role. We now face a 
constitutional dilemma as Justice Brandeis did in Olmstead. Just as he did, today we 
perceive that past invasions had “been necessarily simple,” while today “[s]ubtler and 
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government.”346 And just as he did, courts today must reject the notion that the law will 
allow this development to fundamentally change the relationship between citizens and 
their government.   
“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against 
the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.”347 
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